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STARE DECISIS IN THE INFERIOR COURTS 

OF THE UNITED STATES 
Joseph W. Mead* 
ABSTRACT 
While circuit courts are bound to fallow circuit precedent under "law of the 
circuit" the practice among federal district courts is more varied and uncertain, 
routinely involving little or no deference to their own precedent. I argue that the 
different hierarchical levels and institutional characteristics do not account for the 
differences in practices between circuit and district courts. Rather, district courts can 
and should adopt a "law of the district" similar to that ofcircuit courts. Through this 
narrow proposal, I explore the historical stare decisis practices in federal courts that 
are not Supreme. 
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INTRODUCTION 
No matter how sympathetic the party or how clever the lawyer, most liti­
gation is resolved by stare decisis, where the decisions of the past control the 
future. 1 Generally, courts apply stare decisis in one of two ways. First, courts 
apply governing precedent by adopting the same legal position as the court 
previously adopted in an earlier case (horizontal stare decisis). Alternatively, 
courts also apply decisions of higher courts with supervisory jurisdiction (verti­
cal stare decisis). Because the Supreme Court has remained silent regarding 
many points of law, the federal appellate and district courts bear the responsi­
bility of developing the judiciary's position on most federal law. 
Despite the significant role horizontal stare decisis plays in litigation, legal 
practitioners and scholars have paid relatively little attention to horizontal stare 
decisis at levels outside the Supreme Court. Some have studied narrow issues 
related to appellate courts,2 yet the practices of district courts-where most 
litigation is resolved-have gone virtually unexamined.3 To take the first step 
towards filling this critical gap in our understanding of the lower courts, I 
1 See Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 550 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2008) ("As 
every first-year law student knows, the doctrine of stare decisis is often the determining 
factor in deciding cases brought before any court."); see also Michael Abramowicz & Max­
well Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REv. 953, 956 (2005) (noting the significance of 
stare decisis, and concluding that "scholarly attention is thus warranted" on the subject). 
2 Scholarship addressing appellate court stare decisis typically deals with very specific 
issues. See, e.g., Michael Duvall, Resolving Intra-Circuit Splits in the Federal Courts of 
Appeal, 3 FED. CTS. L. REV. 17, 17-20 (2009); Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn't Bark: 
Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 
FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 713-25 (2009) [hereinafter Stealth Procedures]; Phillip M. Kannan, 
The Precedential Force of Panel Law, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 755, 758-59 (1993). Most of it 
comes from debates over whether certain opinions can be designated non-precedential and 
the implications of that decision. See, e.g., Scott E. Gant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: 
Unpublished Opinions and the New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 47 B.C. L. 
REv. 705, 705-14 (2006); Thomas R. Lee & Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and 
the Judicial Power to "Unpublish" Opinions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 135-40 (2001); 
Dean A. Morande, Comment, Publication Plans in the United States Courts ofAppeals: The 
Unattainable Paradigm, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 751, 752-54 (2004); Martha Dragich Pear­
son, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1235-40 
(2004); Amy E. Sloan, If You Can't Beat 'Em, Join 'Em: A Pragmatic Approach to Non
precedential Opinions in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895, 922-27 (2008) 
[hereinafter Pragmatic Approach]; Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: 
Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions by Statute or Procedural Rule, 19 IND. L.J. 711, 
711-15 (2004) [hereinafter Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions]; Norman R. Williams, 
The Failings of Originalism: The Federal Courts and the Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REv. 761, 762-68 (2004). Another source of debate, mostly of more dated scholar­
ship, is over the long-dead proposal to create a national court of appeals to resolve circuit 
splits. Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved 
Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PrrT. L. REV. 693, 696 (1995). There is also some scholarship 
that, while primarily focusing on vertical precedent, provides useful analysis of intracourt 
stare decisis. Jeffrey C. Dobbins, Structure and Precedent, 108 MrcH. L. REv. 1453, 
1463-66 (2010); Evan H. Carninker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Prece 

dents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 820-21 (1994). 

3 Cf. Hillel Y. Levin, Making the Law: Unpublication in the District Courts, 53 VILL. L. 
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examine the horizontal stare decisis practices of both circuit courts and district 
courts. Through a particularly rigid form of horizontal stare decisis, the circuit 
courts have chosen to adopt "law of the circuit," where a prior reported deci­
sion of a three-judge panel of a court of appeals is binding on subsequent 
panels of that court. In contrast, the practice among federal district courts is 
more varied and uncertain, but routinely involves little or no deference to the 
prior precedent of that same district court.4 Deprived of any significant stare 
decisis effect, district court decisions adjudicate present controversies but do 
not create law for future cases. 
This is a missed opportunity. Despite considering historical practices and 
institutional characteristics, I am unable to account for the modem disparity in 
practices between the two court levels. 5 Instead, I argue that district courts can 
and should adopt stare decisis practices similar to their circuit court counter­
parts, based on the policies underlying stare decisis: predictability, fairness, 
appearance of justice, judicial economy, and collegiality. This narrow thesis 
provides a lens to examine the broader question of what are and what should be 
the stare decisis practices of federal courts that are not Supreme. 6 
To this end, Part I lays the groundwork for the rest of the Article by defin­
ing the analytical framework for stare decisis and outlining the policies that are 
typically attributed to stare decisis at the Supreme Court level. In Part II, I 
explore the historical and current practices of the circuit and district courts. 
Federal court practitioners and scholars may be surprised to learn that the stark 
differences between circuit and district courts were not present until relatively 
recently. In Part III, I argue that district courts have the same legal authority as 
circuit courts to adopt a horizontal stare decisis policy. In Part IV, I argue that 
district courts should exercise this authority, notwithstanding the hierarchical 
and institutional differences between circuit and district courts, and I propose a 
"law of the district" rule that mirrors the law of the circuit. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND PuRPOSES OF STARE DECISIS 
A. Stare Decisis and Structure 
Before proceeding further, a few words explaining this Article's use of 
legal jargon are necessary.7 Put roughly, stare decisis refers to the practice of a 
court deferring to some set of precedent8 for an institutional reason (in contrast 
4 See infra Part 11.B. 
5 See John Harrison, The Power ofCongress over the Rules ofPrecedent, 50 DuKE L.J. 503, 
518 (2000) ("For reasons that are hard to identify ... the federal district courts regard their 
own precedents as persuasive authority only."). 
6 This Article does not purport to resolve this question, but hopes to provide the beginning 
of a productive discussion. 
7 Terms in the stare decisis context are often used interchangeably with one another, or with 
flexibility that drains the terms of meaning. In this Article, I follow the framework of the 
next few paragraphs, both in terms of language and in conceiving the issues addressed. 
8 When I say "precedent," I am using it in a broader sense of not carrying any particular 
weight. It is the application of stare decisis principles to precedent where a precedent 
receives any weight. However, I limit the use of precedent to refer only to pronouncements 
from courts of law, because that is the scope of this Article. Cf Frederick Schauer, Prece­
dent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 571-72 (1987) (using precedent more broadly); Gautam U. Jois, 
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to considering an issue afresh).9 Stare decisis can be vertical or horizontal. Hor­
izontal stare decisis is the practice of a court deferring to its own decisions, 
while vertical stare decisis is the practice of a lower court adhering to the deci­
sions of courts with supervisory jurisdiction, or courts "with the power to 
reverse" the judgment.10 Because this Article focuses on horizontal stare deci­
sis, references to "stare decisis" are to horizontal stare decisis unless otherwise 
noted. 
It is also important to draw a critical yet oft-overlooked11 line between 
horizontal stare decisis, where a court follows its own decision, and that of 
comity, where a court defers to a decision of another court with equal jurisdic­
tion.12 The federal appellate power is subdivided by statute into appellate 
courts within each of thirteen circuits. 13 Three-judge panels wield each circuit's 
power to "hear and determine" most cases, 14 and a decision of a three-judge 
panel in a circuit court is generally given deference by later panels in that cir­
cuit. This exercise of intracourt horizontal stare decisis is in contrast to any 
deference extended from one circuit court to a decision from a different circuit 
court, which is a matter of intercourt comity.15 The distinction between 
intracircuit and extracircuit precedent is enormous: circuits are far less willing 
to extend comity than they are to ignore the demands of stare decisis. 16 




9 Jois, supra note 8, at 68 n.19. 

10 Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 Hous. L. REv. 1143, 1179 (2006). It can be much 

more complicated than that. See Caminker, supra note 2, at 823-28. 

11 For example, both scholarship and courts have blurred a distinction at the district court 

level-between intercourt comity and intracourt stare decisis-that I view as critical. See, 

e.g., Lee & Lehnhof, supra note 2, at 168-70 (citing Taylor v. Royal Saxon, 23 F. Cas. 797, 

800-01 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1849) (declining to follow Certain Logs of Mallogany, 5 F. Cas. 374 

(C.C. Mass. 1837))). 

12 Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 488 (1900); Consumers Union of 

U.S., Inc. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 590 F.2d 1209, 1217-19 (D.C. Cir. 1978) 

(rejecting as "unworthy of comment" argument that stare decisis required deference to sister 

circuit, but considering whether comity nevertheless did), rev'd on other grounds, GTE Syl­

vania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 445 U.S. 375 (1980); In re Aspinwall's Estate, 

90 F. 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1898) (Bradford, J., concurring) ("There can be no doubt that a 

departure would have been taken with even less hesitation from precedents established solely 

by other courts possessing only co-ordinate jurisdiction and authority."); Michael 

Abramowicz, Cyberadjudication, 86 lowAL. REV. 533, 580 n.140 (2001); David L. Shapiro, 

Some Thoughts on Intervention Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 

721, 732-33 (1968). 

13 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 43 (2006). 

14 Id. § 46(c). 

15 United States v. AMC Entm't, Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 771 (9th Cir. 2008). This was not 

inevitable: "If the courts of appeals had been conceived from the beginning as wholly sepa­

rate intermediate appellate courts with nationwide jurisdiction, it is not difficult to envision 

the decisions of such a court as binding nationwide." Dobbins, supra note 2, at 1466. The 

same argument has been made for district courts. Allan D. Vestal, Relitigation by Federal 

Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55 N.C. L. REv. 123, 

171-72 (1977). Perhaps it is conceivable, but the structure of the authorizing statute and the 





16 Compare sources cited supra note 12 with infra Part II.A. 
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District courts have a structure similar to that of circuit courts. Congress 
has established 94 judicial districts, each with one district court and assigned 
district judges.17 By statute, "the judicial power of a district court with respect 
to any action, suit or proceeding may be exercised by a single judge."18 Thus, 
analogous to circuit courts, stare decisis in a district court would attach (if at 
all) to a decision made by a judge in that district, while comity would govern 
the deference extended to decisions of other district courts. 
To say that horizontal stare decisis applies to a decision is the beginning of 
the inquiry, as a later court must decide how much weight stare decisis gives a 
prior precedent. 19 Stare decisis runs the gamut from very strong to very weak.2° 
At the strong end is precedent that is absolutely binding, as is typically the case 
among circuit court panels.21 A less strong version requires adherence to prece­
dent, even if wrongly decided, unless changed circumstances call into question 
the viability of the earlier decision.22 For example, the Supreme Court23 today 
is willing to revisit precedent only after considering several factors: "workabil­
ity ... the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and ... 
whether the decision was well reasoned."24 The Court is more willing to over­
turn precedent in constitutional cases where Congress is unable to reverse the 
Court's decision,25 and in cases interpreting procedural rules where reliance 
interests are minimal.26 
Weaker forms of stare decisis only require deference to precedent so long 
as that precedent offers a reasonable interpretation or reaches a plausible view 
of the legal issue (even if viewed as incorrect).27 The weakest version is when 
authority is "persuasive" only.28 Confusingly, there is an oft-overlooked differ­
ence between precedent that is persuasive authority and precedent that is fol­
lowed because it is persuasive.29 To say, as some have done, that precedent 
should be followed to the extent it is persuasive is to extend no deference at 
17 28 u.s.c. § 132. 

18 Id. § 132(c). 

19 See Pearson, supra note 2, at 1267-68. 









22 See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 





24 Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2088-89 (2009). 

25 Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) ("[W]e must bear in mind that consid­

erations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, where Congress 

is free to change this Court's interpretation of its legislation."). 

26 Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251 (1998) (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 

U.S. 506, 521 (1995)). 

27 Nelson, supra note 20, at 53. 

28 To extend no deference is not a particular "stare decisis" policy, but rather a rejection of 

stare decisis. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare 

Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 





29 Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Allfirst Bank, 282 F. Supp. 2d 339, 351 (D. Md. 2003) 

(describing court's precedent as "persuasive authority entitled to substantial deference" 
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all.3 °Courts follow litigant's briefs to the extent that they persuade the judges, 
but this involves no deference. In contrast, precedent that is persuasive author­
ity receives some weight beyond its immediate ability to persuade, perhaps 
based on the position of the court issuing a decision or the reputation of the 
authority's author.31 As explored in greater detail in later sections, courts have 
adopted stronger or weaker stare decisis at different times, in different circum­
stances, and at different places in the judicial hierarchy. 
B. Why Do Courts Have Stare Decisis? 
"Stare decisis is a 'principle of policy.' "32 While it may be "true that court 
systems need not have . . . stare decisis to function, nor indeed to function 
well,"33 federal courts have relied upon some form of stare decisis since the 
nation's founding. 34 Deference to a court's previous decisions "reflects a policy 
judgment that 'in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of 
law be settled than that it be settled right.' "35 
The Supreme Court has identified four virtues of the consistency that stare 
decisis brings: predictability, fairness, appearance of justice, and efficiency.36 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1201 (noting "[t]he notion of 

authority being 'persuasive' beyond its inherent power to persuade"). 

3 ° Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1987). 

31 Sullivan, supra note 10, at 1201. 

32 United States v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (emphasis omitted); 

see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress 

Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1548 (2000) 

(describing stare decisis as "pure judicial policy"). Although there is some argument that 

some respect towards precedent is constitutionally required as part of the nature of exercis­

ing '1udicial power," Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 901 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated 

as moot, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (2000), the vast majority of the scholarship views stare decisis 

as a policy that can be changed at will by the courts. See generally Jed I. Bergman, Putting 

Precedent in its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 CoLUM. L. 

REv. 969, 974 n.28 (1996) (collecting articles); Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitu 

tional Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 43 (2001); Lee & Lehnhof, supra note 2; Polly J. 

Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81 (2000); Wil­

liams, supra note 2. Indeed, some have argued that, at least in Constitutional cases, stare 

decisis is unconstitutional because it represents an abandonment of the judge's duty to fol­

low the Constitution. Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent 

Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 18-22 (2007); Paulsen, supra. Whatever merit these 

criticisms may have theoretically, stare decisis is well-entrenched in our judicial system. 

33 Jonathan Remy Nash & Rafael I. Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Struc 

ture and the Perceived Quality ofAppellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1745, 1750 (2008). 

34 See generally Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Found 

ing Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 V AND. L. REV. 647 (1999); see also Harry T. Edwards & 

Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls ofEmpirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors 

Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DuKE L.J. 1895, 1897 (2009) ("The doctrine is so 

central to Anglo-American jurisprudence that it scarcely need be mentioned, let alone dis­

cussed at length." (emphasis omitted) (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE 

JumcIAL PROCESS 20 (Yale Univ. Press 1964) (1921))); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis 





35 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

36 Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236 (1998) ("Stare decisis is 'the preferred course 

because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development oflegal princi­

ples, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integ­
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Significantly, none of these depend on the precedent being "correct," however 
defined.37 
Concern for predictability reflects the recognition that change in the law 
disturbs the foundation for countless human interactions. Without predictabil­
ity, contracts and wills drafted under an old legal regime may have different 
meanings, or no meaning at all. 38 Stable law enables the public to know and 
understand what their civic rights and duties are.39 Stare decisis provides the 
"moorings so that men may trade and arrange their affairs with confidence."40 
Predictability benefits not just the public, but lower courts as well.41 
Although predictability is consistency's virtue before a case reaches court, 
fairness is the virtue once in litigation. Inconsistent application of law is unfair 
because it violates the fundamental premise in our legal system that similar 
litigants should be treated similarly.42 In fact, Justice Douglas observed that 
"there will be no equal justice under law if a negligence rule is applied in the 
morning but not in the afternoon."43 Further, stare decisis constrains judicial 
discretion to established rules of law rather than allowing judges to operate on 
whim or caprice.44 
Closely tied to virtue of fairness is the appearance of justice. Stare decisis 
"permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law 
rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the 
integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in 
fact."45 The legitimacy of the courts is enhanced when judges are perceived to 
be dutifully applying law rather than resolving a set of facts without 
constraint.46 
Stare decisis is a policy that also directly benefits the judiciary because 
reliance on precedent conserves limited judicial resources. As Justice Cardozo 
wrote: " '[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point 
rity of the judicial process.'" (internal quotation marks omitted)); James C. Rehnquist, Note, 
The Power That Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, The Constitution and the 

Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L. REv. 345, 347 (1986). 

37 Paulsen, supra note 32, at 1538 n.8. 

38 Schauer, supra note 8, at 595-97; see also William 0. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 

CoLUM. L. REv. 735, 735-36 (1949). 

39 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992) ("Liberty finds no 

refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."). 

40 Douglas, supra note 38, at 736. 

41 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical 

Analysis, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 249, 273 (1976) ("If the U.S. Supreme Court refuses to accord 

precedential weight to earlier Supreme Court decisions, it thereby undermines the preceden­

tial weight of its own decisions."). 

42 Rehnquist, supra note 36, at 347. 

43 Douglas, supra note 38, at 736. 

44 Nelson, supra note 20, at 9 ("To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts ... it is 

indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve to 

define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them ...." (quot­

ing THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)). 

45 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1986). 

46 Kermit Roosevelt III, Polyphonic Stare Decisis: Listening to Non-Article Ill Actors, 83 

No'IRE DAME L. REv. 1303, 1305 (2008) ("If a Court abandons precedent too readily and 

without adequate explanation, observers may conclude that its decisions are driven by pref­

erence rather than principle."). 
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if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay 
one's own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by 
others who had gone before him.' "47 
Weighing against all of these goals are the costs associated with upholding 
precedent. Often such costs are perceived as judicial allowance of "bad" or 
"erroneous" law. However, the negative consequences of stare decisis can be 
stated more objectively as the cost of judges not being able to judge. Or, put 
differently, a decision that is ripe for discarding remains law. As a result, stare 
decisis can tend to calcify the law, causing age-old precedent to linger despite 
developments in other areas of law and in society.48 
II. HORIZONTAL STARE DECISIS PRACTICES AMONG LOWER COURTS 
The Supreme Court could have been the only court to choose to defer to 
its own precedent, but it was not.49 Most circuits have gone further than the 
Supreme Court and adopted very strong rules of intra-court stare decisis for 
panel decisions.so In contrast, district court stare decisis practices are unclear, 
and often non-existent.s1 History, however, proves that this was not always the 
case.s2 
A. Circuit Court Practices 
Without Supreme Court or legislative intervention, though doubtlessly 
looking to the Supreme Court's example, the appellate courts began to formu­
late their own horizontal stare decisis policies. s3 With the arguable exception of 
the Seventh Circuit, s4 each circuit court has adopted some version of "law of 
47 Rehnquist, supra note 36, at 348 (quoting BENJAMIN N. CARoozo, THE NATURE OF THE 
JumcIAL PRocEss 149 (1928)); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 854 (1992) ("With Cardozo, we recognize that no judicial system could do society's 
work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it."). 
48 Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions, supra note 2, at 733. There is much debate over 
whether the balance of interests justifies stare decisis. Rather than wade into this debate, I 
take a narrower approach: I assume the status quo is justified for the Supreme Court and for 
circuit courts, and ponder why it has not been extended to district courts. 
49 See Part II. 
50 See Part II.A. 
51 See Part 11.B. 
52 See Part 11.B. 
53 See Harrison, supra note 5, at 530; Stealth Procedures, supra note 2, at 722 ("[T]he 
corresponding rules regarding stare decisis and the law of the circuit, are rules made by the 
courts themselves, not by legislative fiat."); Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judici­
ary, 107th Cong. 9 (2002) (statement of Alito, J.) ("The doctrine of precedent (stare decisis) 
was established as part of the common law, and the development of this doctrine has long 
been committed primarily to the stewardship of the Third Branch."). 
54 The Seventh Circuit follows a less rigid stare decisis rule, allowing one panel to overrule 
another. United States v. Reyes-Hernandez, 624 F.3d 405, 412-13 (7th Cir. 2010); see also 
7rn Cm. R. 40(e) ("A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position 
which would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a conflict between or among 
circuits shall not be published unless it is first circulated among the active members of this 
court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear en bane the issue of whether the position 
should be adopted."). 
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the circuit."55 A common iteration of the law of the circuit, though one that 
glosses over its considerable complexity, is that a subsequent panel is bound by 
the holding of a previously published decision in that circuit.56 
The adoption of a law-of-the-circuit rule is a "relatively modern judicial 
phenomenon."57 Historically, some deference was extended, but panels could 
reject precedent if it was erroneous in the later panel's eyes.58 Moreover, prece­
dent was not followed when a later court believed the earlier decision contained 
an important factual error.59 Circuit courts were also free to disregard their own 
precedent under various exceptions that swallowed the rule, including constitu­
tional cases60 and criminal cases.61 The later panel always had the discretion 
(albeit with ostensible limits on that discretion) to decide whether to follow an 
earlier decision. 62 
55 Stealth Procedures, supra note 2, at 719 n.29 (2009) (collecting cases). 

56 E.g., Hinchman v. Moore, 312 F.3d 198, 203 (6th Cir. 2002). 

57 John B. Oakley, Precedent in the Federal Courts ofAppeals: An Endangered or Invasive 

Species?, 8 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCESS 123, 127 (2006); see also Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 
1155, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 2001); Amy Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. 
Cow. L. REv. 1011, 1065-66 (2003) ("The rules that give modem stare decisis doctrine 
much of its rigor are decidedly modem."); Lee & Lenhoff, supra note 2, at 154. For a 
contrary view, see Dobbins, supra note 2, at 1463-65. Professor Dobbins asserts that circuit 
courts have always employed binding forms of stare decisis. Unfortunately, Dobbins only 
cites modem cases which do not shed light on the historical practice. In contrast, I believe 
the case citations in this paragraph show a different understanding of history, which is con­
sistent with the weight of authority. Notwithstanding this possible oversight, which does not 
undermine his thesis, Professor Dobbins's work is a thoughtful, well-reasoned addition to the 
scholarship on stare decisis. 
58 United States v. Cocke, 399 F.2d 433, 448 (5th Cir. 1968) ("Our law is neither moribund 
nor muscle-bound. There are justifiable escapes and liberations from the rigidities and 
inflexibilities of stare decisis."); Perrone v. Pa. R. Co., 143 F.2d 168, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1944); 
Chicago & W.I.R. Co. v. Chicago & E.R. Co., 140 F.2d 120, 121 (7th Cir. 1943) (choosing 
to reconsider prior case); McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1943); New 
York Life Ins. Co. v. Ross, 30 F.2d 80, 83 (6th Cir. 1929); Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car 
Co., 261 F. 878, 886 (2d Cir. 1919) (noting that court was free to reject prior decision if 
substantially wrong); Pink Supply Co. v. United States, 32 C.C.P.A. 48, 52, 1944 WL 3662 
(Cust. & Pat. App. 1944) (prior decisions should be followed unless "clearly erroneous"); 
Stephen L. Wasby, Inconsistency in the United States Courts of Appeals: Dimensions and 
Mechanisms for Resolution, 32 VAND. L. REv. 1343, 1346-51 (1979) (discussing inconsis­
tency among panel decisions in the Ninth Circuit in the 1970s). 
59 Moore v. United States, 157 F.2d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 1946); Bresnallan v. Tripp Giant 
Leveller Co., 99 F. 280, 280 (1st Cir. 1900). 
60 Whiteside v. S. Bus Lines, 177 F.2d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 1949). 
61 Jones v. United States, 175 F.2d 544, 551 (9th Cir. 1949) ("[A] criminal case affords no 
proper occasion for the application of the doctrine of stare decisis."); see also United States 
v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., concurring). 
62 Stephen J. Powell & M. Linda Concannon, Stare Decisis in the Court of International 
Trade: One Court or Many?, in U.S. TRADE LAw & PoucY 351, 358 (PLI Commercial Law 
and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. A4-4178, 1987) ("For many years, however, any 
individual panel had the authority to overrule the decision of another panel."); see William 
L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent - Limited Publica­
tion and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1167, 
1190, 1201 (1978). 
796 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:787 
Weak stare decisis began to change in the 1960s, and the rule removing 
discretion from panels was solidified through the 1970s.63 Although it is not 
precisely clear what sparked the change, it can probably be attributed to the 
confluence of two phenomena: an increase in the number of cases and judges,64 
and the birth of limited publication practices.65 More judges deciding more 
cases led to more opinions, which threatened intracircuit consistency.66 Moreo­
ver, the increase in the number of judges tended to make the courts less cohe­
sive, and increased the likelihood of strong disagreements between panels.67 
The need for intracircuit uniformity thus encouraged a more rigid rule. At the 
same time, the ability of a panel to explicitly endorse an opinion as "published" 
enhanced the decision's status: not only in symbolic effect, but by limiting the 
number of precedents entitled to heightened deference and by signaling that the 
precedent is the product of some heightened attention by the deciding judges.68 
"The 'law of the circuit' rule is a subset of stare decisis."69 Though each 
three-judge panel does not represent all judges on the circuit, it does wield the 
63 Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 61 N.C. L. REV. 29, 35-37 (1988). 
The D.C. and the Fifth Circuit appear to have been the first to adopt law of the circuit, dating 
back to perhaps the late 1950s. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818, 828 (5th 
Cir. 1967) ("This Court, unlike some of our sister Circuit Courts who occasionally follow a 
different course, has long tried earnestly to follow the practice in which a decision 
announced by one panel of the Court is followed by all others until such time as it is 
reversed, either outright or by intervening decisions of the Supreme Court, or by the Court 
itself en bane."); Davis v. Peerless Ins. Co., 255 F.2d 534, 536 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ("This 
division of the court is not free to overrule so recent a decision as that in the Barnard case, 
for only by action of the entire court, sitting en bane, will such a step be taken."); Woolley v. 
E. Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.2d 86, 91 (5th Cir. 1957) ("We hold therefore that the rule of stare 
decisis requires that we adhere to the Sigfred and Majors opinions and hold that the com­
plaint did not state a claim against defendants upon which relief could be granted."). But see 
Hunter v. United States, 323 F.2d 625, 627, n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("It is significant in this 
latter regard to recall our established practice to the effect that a division of the court will not 
overrule a recent decision of another division; that is an appropriate function of the full 
bench."); Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Roosth, 306 F.2d 110, 113 (5th Cir. 1962) ("[T]his rule of 
practice is not a limit of power."). This may not have been quite as clear a rule as the 
opinions suggest. Cocke, 399 F.2d at 448 ("Our law is neither moribund nor muscle-bound. 
There are justifiable escapes and liberations from the rigidities and inflexibilities of stare 
decisis."). By 1970, other circuits began to state that they were "bound" by circuit precedent. 
Whatley v. United States, 428 F.2d 806, 807 (5th Cir. 1970); see Goff v. Pfau, 418 F.2d 649, 
654 (8th Cir. 1969). 
64 See Robert L. Tucker, Vexatious Litigation as Unfair Competition, and the Application of 
the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 22 Omo N.U. L. REv. 119, 119 n.1 (1995) (noting increase 
in filings and appeals between 1953 and 1983). 
65 See Gant, supra note 2, at 708-10. 
66 See Oakley, supra note 57, at 127-28 (stating that law of the circuit "is largely a product 

of the past thirty years' mounting caseloads"). 

67 Wasby, supra note 58, at 1344. 

68 E.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1177 (9th Cir. 2001). 

69 San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2010); see also FDIC v. 

Abraham, 137 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 1998); Dep't of the Treasury v. Fed. Labor Relations 
Auth., 862 F.2d 880, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The doctrine of stare decisis 'demands that we 
abide by a recent decision of one panel of this court unless the panel has withdrawn the 
opinion or the court en bane has overruled it.'" (emphasis omitted)); Rebecca Hanner White, 
Time for a New Approach: Why the Judiciary Should Disregard the "Law of the Circuit" 
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circuit's statutory authority to "hear[] and determin[e]" appeals70 and, there­
fore, it "speak[s] on behalf of the circuit."71 Thus, implementing the law of the 
circuit, later panels in a particular circuit must follow the decisions of previous 
panels in the same circuit. The potential difficulty of having some judges bind 
others is mitigated (though not eliminated) by the practice in several circuits of 
informally circulating precedential opinions to all judges for comment.72 
The modern law-of-the-circuit rules are actually more pliant than they first 
appear.73 Most circuits allow a later panel to overturn an earlier decision if it 
was rejected by an intervening decision of a higher authority.74 Some circuits 
even extend this power to situations where other developments in the law, 
"although not directly controlling, offer[ ] a sound reason for believing that the 
former panel, in light of fresh developments, would change its collective 
mind."75 Courts are not bound by "dicta" of earlier decisions,76 although it is 
not always easy to determine what counts as "dicta" and what is actually essen­
tial to the holding.77 Nor are courts bound by conclusions implicit in the hold-
When Confronting Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. 
REv. 639, 672-73 (1991). 
70 28 U.S.C. §§ 46(b) & (c) (2006). If we take seriously the statements that circuit panels 
are "without power" to overrule earlier precedent, e.g., Phillip v. United States, 229 F.3d 
550, 552 (6th Cir. 2000), these rules might violate this section. Kannan, supra note 2, at 759. 
If taken at face value, law of the circuit deprives individual panels of a judicial power that is 
retained by the circuit as a whole (which, through the en bane court, can overturn published 
precedent). More likely, courts are simply stating that, although they retain the power, they 
will not exercise it as a matter of good practice. McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 
334 (4th Cir. 2004) (en bane) ("[W]e recognize that a three-judge panel has the statutory and 
constitutional power to overrule the decision of another three-judge panel."). In any event, 
no court has held law of the circuit rules to be invalid, and if they were, a simple clarification 
that circuit panels should not, rather than cannot, ignore prior circuit cases satisfies this 
objection. 
71 Duvall, supra note 2, at 1 7. 
72 3d Cir. 1.0.P. 5.5.4; see also 3d Cir. 1.0.P. 5.7; 6 Cir. 1.0.P. 206. 
73 See Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice ofPrece­
dent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 541, 545 (1989) ("[E]xperience tells 
us that the formal rule of stare decisis does not necessarily guarantee consistency within a 
jurisdiction."). 
74 Circuits differ in how much the earlier decision must be undermined before it can be 
overruled. See United States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 562 F.3d 892, 898 n.4 (8th Cir. 2009) 
("In the Ninth Circuit, a three-judge panel may reexamine a prior panel decision only if a 
supervening Supreme Court decision is 'clearly irreconcilable.' By contrast, we may recon­
sider a prior panel's decision if a supervening Supreme Court decision 'undermines or casts 
doubt on the earlier panel decision."' (quoting K.C. 1986 Ltd. P'ship v. Reade Mfg., 472 
F.3d 1009, 1022 (8th Cir. 2007))); see also United States v. Peltier, 505 F.3d 389, 394 n.18 
(5th Cir. 2007); Recent Case, Ninth Circuit Holds that Three-Judge Panels May Declare 
Prior Cases Overruled When Intervening Supreme Court Precedent Undercuts the Theory of 
Earlier Decisions: Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en bane), 117 HARv. L. 
REv. 719, 722-23 (2003). 
75 San Juan Cable LLC v. P.R. Tel. Co., 612 F.3d 25, 33 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting Williams 
v. Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir. 1995)). 

76 E.g., Fm-Con Constr. Corp. v. Controlled Air, Inc., 574 F.3d 527, 542 (8th Cir. 2009). 

77 See Garcia v. Holder, 621 F.3d 906, 911 (9th Cir. 2010); compare United States v. Har­

din, 539 F.3d 404, 410-11 (6th Cir. 2008) (Moore, J.), with id. at 440 (Batchelder, J.) 

("[T]he majority has effectively nullified the Pruitt-majority's position (i.e., holding) by 

calling it 'simply dicta.'"). See generally Abramowicz & Steams, supra note 1. 
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ing that were not briefed or discussed.78 And, of course, a panel can distinguish 
or limit precedent, perhaps unpersuasively.79 Notwithstanding these exceptions, 
the law of the circuit is still quite rigid80-far more rigid than the horizontal 
stare decisis practices of the Supreme Court. 81 
However, an entire circuit is not forever bound by a three-judge decision. 
The en bane procedure allows all active judges to sit and decide a single case. 
Sitting en bane, circuit judges are not bound by prior panel decisions, but may 
give some deference to well-entrenched precedent.82 In addition, some circuit 
courts have an informal en bane procedure where a panel can circulate to all 
circuit judges a proposed opinion overruling precedent and obtain the major­
ity's acquiescence through a vote.83 
Modem law-of-the-circuit rules have several interesting features. First, not 
all decisions of a court have the same stare decisis weight.84 Rather, circuits 
employ a dichotomy between published and unpublished opinions. 85 Published 
78 Gonzales v. Dep't Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2007). 

79 E.g., BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sentelle, J., dissent­

ing); Smith v. Pyro Mining. Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1097 (6th Cir. 1987) (Krupansky, J., dis­

senting); Barrett, supra note 57, at 1020-21; Wasby, supra note 58, at 1358-59. 

80 Barrett, supra note 57, at 1020-21. 

81 See also Rutherford v. Columbia Gas, 575 F.3d 616, 625-26 (6th Cir. 2009) (Clay, J., 

dissenting) (contrasting law of the circuit with the traditional formulation of stare decisis). 

82 See United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2007) (en bane); see also 

Michael Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 CoLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1621 (2000). The 

Ninth Circuit, with 29 active judgeships, also utilizes a limited en bane court where 11 

judges meet and decide a case, with the full court having the option of reviewing the limited 

en bane court's judgment. 

83 United States ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2009); 

Shipping Corp. of India. v. Jaldhi Overseas PTE Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 67 & n.9 (2d Cir. 2009); 

7TH Cm. R. 40(e). See generally Stealth Procedures, supra note 2; Michael S. Kanne, The 

"Non-Banc En Banc": Seventh Circuit Rule 40(e) and the Law of the Circuit, 32 S. ILL. U. 

L.J. 611, 611 (2008). 
84 Over the last decade, there has been a vigorous debate over the publication practices of 
the circuit courts. This debate has fallen into two categories. The first aspect of the debate is 
whether circuit courts can ignore unpublished opinions. Some argued that precedent is a 
defining feature of judicial power, and therefore courts must presumptively adhere to prece­
dent, Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 
F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (en bane), while others have gone to great lengths to refute 
this argument. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2001); Williams v. Dallas 
Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 260 (5th Cir. 2001); Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson 
Med., 277 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Barrett, supra note 57, at 1011 n.l 
(collecting articles). This Article assumes that the current practice of extending stare decisis 
to some, but not all, prior opinions of the court is constitutional, as the weight of authority 
has held. Even if Article III required that stare decisis must be extended to all opinions, 
whether published or not, this would further support the thesis that district courts must 
adhere to their own precedent. There is also a more general debate about whether litigants 
should be allowed to cite unpublished opinions to the court, Patrick J. Schiltz, Much Ado 
About Little: Explaining the Sturm und Drang over the Citation of Unpublished Opinions, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429, 1433 n.11 (2005), but the passage of FED. R. APP. P. 32.1, 
which allows citation of opinions, has ended the debate for now. "Rule 32.1 would not, of 
course, require courts to treat their unpublished opinions as binding precedent." Schiltz, 
supra, at 1484. 
85 Published opinions are those included in an official reporter, such as the Federal Reporter 
(for circuit court opinions) or the Federal Supplement (for district court opinions). Levin, 
supra note 3, at 983. In this era of Westlaw and Lexis electronic databases, referring to 
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opinions are given conclusive weight, while unpublished opinions are often 
given minimal (if any) consideration.86 The weight given by the circuit to a 
decision also determines the weight given to it by lower courts. As a result, 
lower district courts in the circuit need not follow unpublished decisions, but 
are fully bound by any published pronouncement.87 While it is typically up to 
the judge or judges who issued the decision to designate an opinion as pub­
lished, local rules often provide criteria to be applied when making publication 
decisions.88 The factors are flexible, and publication practices vary between 
judges.89 Some circuits also explicitly allow counsel to move for publication, 
although the ultimate decision rests with the judge.90 The upshot of this is that 
the original panel, not a later court, decides the precedential weight of the 
opinion.91 
Another notable feature of the circuit stare decisis rules is the manner in 
which the rules are promulgated. Although originally adopted through case law, 
many circuits have since codified their practices in Circuit Rules or Internal 
Operating Procedures.92 Others have simply relied on case law to establish the 
circuit's practices.93 Today, judges accept the law-of-the-circuit rules without 
opinions as "published" or "unpublished" is inaccurate and downright confusing. Id. at 

983-84; Morande, supra note 2, at 754; see also Brian P. Brooks, Publishing Unpublished 

Opinions, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 259, 259 (2002) (noting that, due to recent developments, "the 

concept of the 'unpublished opinion' is no longer a legal fiction-it is fiction, pure and 

simple."). Nevertheless, procedural rules preserve this dichotomy. 

86 United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236, 239 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010) (giving "independent 

determination" of an issue because earlier decision was unpublished). There is, no doubt, 

considerable variation in how courts treat unpublished precedent. See Pragmatic Approach, 

supra note 2, at 922. 

87 E.g., Fonseca v. Consol. Rail Corp., 246 F.3d 585, 591 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[U]npublished 

opinions are never controlling authority."); GTE Mobilnet of Cal. Ltd. P'Ship v. City and 

Cnty. of S.F., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1104 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2006). But see Alshrafi v. Am. 

Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 150, 159-60 n.9 (D. Mass. 2004); Patrick J. Schiltz, The 

Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 

23, 69 (2005) (noting argument that "district courts would feel bound to follow" the unpub­

lished opinions of their circuit court). Again, this comment is limited to the stare decisis 

effect of the opinion, and not law of the case, collateral estoppels, or mandate rules. 

88 See generally, Morande, supra note 2; Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalk 

ing Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts ofAppeals, 54 V AND. 

L. REV. 71 (2001). 

89 See Morande, supra note 2, at 761-62. 

90 4rn CrR. Loe. R. 36(b); 8rn CIR. 1.0.P. IV.B. 

91 Prohibiting Non-Precedential Opinions, supra note 2, at 729-30. This is quite a depar­

ture from the traditional idea that the value of precedent should be weighed by the panel 

considering the precedent. Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law's Case Against Non-Prec 

edential Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 772-73 (2003). 

92 E.g., 3D CIR. 1.0.P. 9.1; 4rn CIR. Loe. R. 36(b); 6rn CIR. R. 206(c) ("Reported panel 

opinions are binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules a published 

opinion of a previous panel. Court en bane consideration is required to overrule a published 

opinion of the court."); 8rn CIR. 1.0.P. IV.B; FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(l). 

93 E.g., Shubargo v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 1086, 1088 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007). The Eleventh and 

Federal Circuits, the youngest of the circuits, issued opinions en bane early in their existence 

deciding what form of horizontal stare decisis they would follow. S. Corp. v. United States, 

690 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en bane); Bonnerv. City of Prichard, 661F.2d1206, 

1209 (1 lth Cir. 1981) (en bane). 
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major objection,94 but this was not inevitable.95 The difficulty of imposing a 
new stare decisis rule on an entire court was illustrated by the Sixth Circuit's 
early experience with the law of the circuit. A panel declared in 1978 that 
"[o]ne panel of this Court cannot overrule the decision of another panel; only 
the Court sitting en bane can overrule a prior decision."96 In 1979, over the 
dissent' s objections, a panel rejected this precedent and instead declared "there 
is no rule in this Circuit which requires an en bane hearing to overrule a deci­
sion of a three-judge panel."97 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit removed any lin­
gering doubt of the rule's validity by codifying stare decisis in its practices and 
clarifying its application for future courts and litigants.98 In any event, the law 
of the circuit has been in place for enough time that it is unlikely that a circuit 
court judge would resist the rule at this date. 
B. District Court Practices 
While circuit courts currently follow a very strong version of stare decisis, 
there is generally no similar "law of the district" doctrine in federal district 
court.99 Thus, one district judge is not bound by the earlier decision of another 
judge in the same district. This simple statement masks great diversity in the 
approaches that district courts have taken, are taking, and could take in the 
future. 
Historically, district judges extended great deference to the prior decisions 
within their district. 100 Intra-district precedent normally would be followed 
94 A survey of circuit judges found that "'nearly all ... felt strongly constrained by the 
norms of stare decisis.'" Emery G. Lee III, Horizontal Stare Decisis on the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 92 KY. L.J. 767, 773 & n.41 (2004) (quoting J. WOODFORD 
HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE 
SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS 163-66 (1981)). 
95 There is a circular nature to law of the circuit in those circuits which rely only on prior 
panel case law to establish it. A case says that later panels are bound by earlier panels, but 
later panels are bound by that assertion only if they accept the premise that they are bound 
by that case. A similar potential difficulty exists at the Supreme Court. A new Supreme 
Court justice could, consistent with the obligation to follow the Constitution, reject stare 
decisis and, by extension, the numerous cases establishing the doctrine. This problem is 
theoretical, as no justice has adopted explicitly this position. In fact, potential justices are 
vetted during their confirmation hearings about their view of stare decisis. 
96 Timmreck v. United States, 577 F.2d 372, 376 n.15 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other 
grounds, 441 U.S. 780 (1979). 
97 Speigner v. Jago, 603 F.2d 1208, 1212 n.4 (6th Cir. 1979) (Peck, J.); see also Melamed v. 
ITT Cont'l Baking Co., 592 F.2d 290, 295 (6th Cir. 1979) (rejecting prior Sixth Circuit 
case), abrogated by Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 373 n.10 (1981). 
Speigner, 603 F.2d at 1217 (Weick, J., dissenting) ("And, of course, if we have any regard 
for the rule of stare decisis, we ought to follow our own decisions. Other panels of the Court 
should respect them. No panel of this Court has the power or right to overrule the decision of 
another panel. ... The overruling should be the function of an en bane court, and not that of 
a single panel, unless a subsequent Supreme Court decision overrules the decision on which 
the panel relied." (citing Timmreck, 577 F.2d at 376 n.15)). 
98 6rn CIR. R. 206(c). 
99 Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., 928 F.2d 1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991) (collecting 
cases). 
100 Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, 
41 UCLA L. REv. 1063, 1095 (1994) (noting a "long tradition within district courts of devi­
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without examination or discussion, absent "unusual and exceptional circum­
stances."101 Thus, while disagreement would not provide a sufficient basis to 
reject an earlier decision, the presumption of following intra-court precedent 
could be overcome. 102 Therefore, like circuit judges, district judges retained the 
power to revisit precedent, and significant deference was usually the norm.103 
Although there is considerable ambiguity regarding horizontal stare deci­
sis in district courts, 104 the modem trend is moving away from extending any 
ating from a co-ordinate judge's prior decision only in 'extraordinary circum­

stances.' "(collecting cases)). 

101 Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 1969); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709, 

717-18 (8th Cir. 1964); In re Kirk, 198 F. Supp. 771, 771 (W.D. Pa. 1961); United States v. 

Jannuzzio, 22 F.R.D. 223, 226 (D. Del. 1958) (follow "except in unusual and exceptional 

circumstances"); In re Terzich, 153 F. Supp. 651, 653 (W.D. Pa. 1957); Sears Roebuck & 

Co. v. Stockwell, 143 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D. Minn. 1956) (based on stare decisis, prior 

opinion "[i]n the absence of palpable mistake or error ... should be respected as the law 

until changed by an appellate court."); Williams v. Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 125 F. 

Supp. 675, 677 (W.D. Wash. 1954) (stating that "[i]t would be inappropriate" to reconsider 

earlier district court decisions "in the absence of exceptional circumstances"); United States 

v. Harris, 109 F. Supp. 641, 642 (D.D.C. 1953) ("[O]pinion is stare decisis, and will be 
followed by the court."), rev'd on other grounds, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); United States v. 
Firman, 98 F. Supp. 944, 946 (W.D. Pa. 1951) ("Judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not 
ordinarily overrule decisions of their associates based on the same set of facts, unless 
required by higher authority."); Mayer v. Marcus Mayer Co., 25 F. Supp. 58, 61 (E.D. Pa. 
1938) ("The ruling made in that case is authoritative and controls this Court, whatever may 
be the individual opinion of the sitting Judge."); Am. Scantic Line, Inc. v. United States, 27 
F. Supp. 271, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Brusselback v. Cago Corp., 24 F. Supp. 524, 531 
(S.D.N.Y. 1938) (stating court was "require[d] ... to follow [prior] ruling, even if [it] did 
not agree with it."); In re Markowitz, 233 F. 715, 715 (E.D. Pa. 1916) ("In the absence of a 
ruling by an appellate court, we regard the ruling made by this court as binding upon us 
...."); see also Cepo v. Brownell, 147 F. Supp. 517, 521 (N.D. Cal. 1957) (supplement to 
opinion explaining that court contradicted earlier district court precedent in opinion because 
it was not aware of it at the time the opinion came out); cf. Williams v. Tide Water Associ­
ated Oil Co., 227 F.2d 791, 792 n.3 (9th Cir. 1955) (holding that, if split of authority devel­
ops within district, district court has to exercise independent judgment); United States v. 
Hirschhorn, 21 F.2d 758, 759-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1927) (noting "general rule that a matter which 
is decided by any District Judge in this district should be ... without re-examination by 
another judge, so decided" but rejecting precedent because it was a criminal case). Contra 
White v. Baltic Conveyor Co., 209 F. Supp. 716, 722 (D. N.J. 1962). There are also many 
earlier cases stating that one judge should not overrule another on the same court, but these 
cases are distinguishable as they deal with litigants asking another district judge to directly 
review the decision of another. E.g., Jurgenson v. Nat'l Oil & Supply Co., 63 F.2d 727 (3d 
Cir. 1933); Commercial Union Bank of Am. v. Anglo-S. Am. Bank, 10 F.2d 937, 941 (2d 
Cir. 1925) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Mathies, 350 F.2d 963, 964 (3d Cir. 
1965) (drawing this distinction). 
102 But see Charles H. Nalls & Paul R. Bardos, Stare Decisis and the U.S. Court ofInterna­
tional Trade: Two Case Studies of a Perennial Issue, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 139, 146 
(1991) ("[M]ost treatises consider a district court judge to be bound by the decisions of his 
... colleagues on the court ...."); Powell & Concannon, supra note 62, at 358. 
103 Johns v. Redeker, 406 F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 1969); Indus. Models Corp. v. Kurtz, 93 
F. Supp. 336, 340 (E.D. Mich. 1950) (prior decision "is not absolutely binding."); Lee & 

Lehnhof, supra note 2, at 169. 

104 Erin O'Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic Anal 

ysis ofStare Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 773 (1993) ("It is unclear whether district 

courts actually follow a rule of horizontal stare decisis ."); Powell & Concannon, supra note 
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deference. 105 For reasons that are not clear, 106 as the circuit courts began to 
impose stronger versions of stare decisis on themselves, district courts began to 
depart more readily from their precedent. 107 Today, if intra-district precedent is 
even noted in an opinion, it is dismissed with little difficulty .108 Often, courts 
recite the fact that there is no "law of the district" and do not take the next step 
of considering whether deference should be extended. 109 The common view 
today among district courts is that the court's precedent should be considered 
only to the extent its reasoning persuades.11° This has led some to describe the 
stare decisis effect of district court decisions as "negligible."111 Notwithstand­
ing this general trend, some courts do extend deference, either expressly112 or 
informally.113 
At least one district judge has attempted to articulate a stare decisis prac­
tice similar to that of the circuit courts. In Alexander v. Davis,114 a judge from 
62, at 359 ("An examination of case law reveals varying attitudes toward stare decisis at the 

district court level."). 

105 Vertext Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D. Mass. 

2009); Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Techs. Corp., 623 F.Supp. 2d 1055, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2009); 

Clower v. Orthalliance, Inc., 337 F.Supp. 2d 1322, 1335 (N.D. Ga. 2004); In re Oxford 

Health Plans, Inc., 191 F.R.D. 369, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Principles of stare decisis do not 

require this Court to give any deference to decisions of another district judge."). 

106 See infra text accompanying notes 296-99 for one possible explanation. 

107 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 

108 E.g., Fraction v. Minnesota, 678 F. Supp. 2d 908, 921 n.6 (D. Minn. 2008); Disability 

Advocates & Counseling Grp., Inc. v. Betancourt, 379 F. Supp. 2d 1343, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 

2005); McCoy v. Gen. Motors Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d 939, 942 n.l (N.D. Ill. 2002); 

Budgetel Inns, Inc. v. Micros Sys., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 720, 725 (E.D. Wis. 1999); see also 

Anthony v. Small Tube Mfg. Corp., 580 F. Supp. 2d 409, 424 n.50 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (reaching 

same result for different reasons). This does not take into account courts that will not read or 

consider, much less cite, contrary district court authority. Cf. Hellman, supra note 2, at 709. 

109 E.g., Benavidez v. Irving lndep. Sch. Dist., 690 F. Supp. 2d 451, 462 (N.D. Tex. 2010); 

Pears v. Mobile Cnty., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1076 n.18 (S.D. Ala. 2009); Cactus Comer, 

LLC v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 346 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2004); and sources cited 

supra note 108. 

110 Cooley v. Bd. of Educ., 703 F. Supp. 2d 772, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Chimie v. PPG 

Indus., 218 F.R.D. 416, 420 (D. Del. 2003) ("[W]hile I have the greatest respect for my 

colleagues in this district, my duty now is to apply the law as fairly and logically as I 

understand it."); Broaddrick v. Exec. Office of the President, 139 F. Supp. 2d 55, 59 (D.D.C. 

2001) (considering district precedent for its "persuasive value" and undertaking an "indepen­

dent assessment of the law as it is applied to this case"); IBM Credit Corp. v. United Home 

for Aged Hebrews, 848 F. Supp. 495, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("District court rulings have 

influence only to the extent that jurists in other cases find them convincing, as would indeed 

be the case with other forms of legal analysis."). 

111 Harris v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 938 F.2d 720, 723 (7th Cir. 1991). 

112 Peterson v. BASF Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 964, 970 (D. Minn. 1998) (basing deference on 

stare decisis); Flores v. Stock, 715 F. Supp. 1468, 1471 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (only depart in 

"unusual or exceptional circumstances" (quoting Buna v. Pac. Far E. Line, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 

1360, 1365 (N.D. Cal. 1977))); Mueller v. Allen, 514 F. Supp. 998, 1000-01 (D. Minn. 
1981); cf McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1331 (1 lth Cir. 2004) ("The general rule is 
that a district judge's decision neither binds another district judge nor binds him, although a 
judge ought to give great weight to his own prior decisions."). 
113 Bussel, supra note 100, at 1080 (suggesting "the practical reality that even if district 
courts have the power to depart from prior district court decisions, they are unlikely to do 
so"). 
114 Alexander v. Davis, 282 F. Supp. 2d 609 (W.D. Mich. 2003). 
803 Summer 2012] STARE DECISIS IN THE INFERIOR COURTS 
the Wes tern District of Michigan concluded that published opinions from the 
district were stare decisis and should not be readily disregarded.11 5 The court 
analogized to the circuit court's stare decisis practices: 
In terms of stare decisis, the Sixth Circuit has ruled as to its own precedent that the 
first published decision on an issue should bind later judges until overruled by the 
Circuit (sitting en bane) or the United States Supreme Court. While the Sixth Circuit 
has not directly applied this rule to district court precedent (precisely because it has 
had no reason to do so since it is not bound by district court precedent), there is no 
reason to understand stare decisis much differently in the district courts. 116 
In support, the court identified three policy reasons furthered by district 
court stare decisis. Without stare decisis, citizens would be "unable to adhere 
their conduct to the law" in a multi-judge district. 117 In addition, legal rules 
would depend solely on the judges and not on broader principles of law.118 
Finally, removing already settled points of law from consideration promotes 
judicial economy.119 Other judges in that district, however, have not felt bound 
by district precedent. 120 
There are several surprising things about district court stare decisis prac­
tices. First, unlike well-defined circuit court stare decisis practices, there are 
few clear rules for district courts. Practices are unwritten (or, at best, mentioned 
briefly through the opinions of individual judges), uncertain, and vary from 
individual judge to judge.121 The circumstances under which judges extend def­
erence remain a mystery. 122 
Second, to the extent that it is discernible, the current district courts have 
adopted none of the other features that define circuit court stare decisis prac­
tices. Generally, district courts do not care whether the decision under consider­
ation was from another judge of the same district, the same circuit, or 
somewhere else entirely. 123 In contrast, for the stare decisis practices of the 
115 Id. at 611-12; see also Grand Rapids Pub. Sch. v. P.C. ex rel. D.C., 308 F. Supp. 2d 

815, 818 (W.D. Mich. 2004); Charter Twp. of Oshtemo v. Am. Cyanamid Co., No. 

1:92:CV:843, 1993 WL 561814, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 19, 1993) (stating prior decision 

was "law of [the] district"). Note that all of these decisions were decided by the same judge. 

116 Alexander, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (citation omitted). 





119 Id. at 612; see also Grand Rapids, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 818 ("The policy of stare decisis 

is beautiful in both its simplicity and its effect-judicial economy of decision-making and 

ease of reading and adhering to the law."). 

120 Brown Bark I, L.P. v. Traverse City Light & Power Dep't, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1112 

n.4 (W.D. Mich. 2010) ("[D]istrict-court decisions never have precedential force beyond the 

parties and their privies."); In re Livingston, 379 B.R. 711, 725 n.16 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 

2007), rev'd on other grounds, 422 B.R. 645 (W.D. Mich. 2009). 





123 E.g., In re Exec. Office of the President, 215 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Colby v. J.C. 

Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1122-23 (7th Cir. 1987); Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Tech., 

Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 311 (D. Del. 2000) ("[W]hile the opinion of one district judge 

may be found to be persuasive, it is not binding on another district judge (even if that judge 

happens to sit in the same district)."). In contrast, at least one district court has made its prior 

decisions preferred authorities, placing them allead of authority from other circuits and dis­

tricts. See S.D. Omo Crv. R. 7.2(b)(2) ("In citing authorities, the Court prefers that counsel 

rely upon cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, the United States Court 
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circuit courts, the degree of deference extended-and the rationales for 
extending that deference-hinge on such distinctions. 124 
In addition, the modem approach amongst district courts is to treat pub­
lished and unpublished decisions alike. Thus, district courts typically do not 
assign greater persuasive or stare decisis value to published opinions, nor less 
value to unpublished decisions (at least not overtly). 125 In fact, district judges 
have rejected requests to publish or not publish a decision for the reason that it 
has no change on its precedential value. 126 One district judge, recognizing this 
trend towards treating publication as irrelevant, even referred to the publication 
of district court opinions as a "vanity press."127 This practice of deference 
regardless of publication is in sharp contrast to the enormous significance that 
circuit courts place on publication. 128 
What explains these differences? 
III. DrsJRICT CouRTS HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO ADOPT 

A STRONG STARE DECISIS DOCTRINE 

In light of the ample, although recent, decisions choosing not to employ 
strong (or even any) stare decisis in district courts, two questions arise: whether 
district courts can give strong stare decisis deference to their own decisions, 
and whether they should. The answer to the question of authority is easier: 
district courts have the same power to set the weight of precedent as any other 
court. (As will be seen in the next section, the second question is a bit trickier 
than the first.) 
The premise driving stare decisis is that the court has already spoken to 
the issue, and the authority to defer-whether weakly or strongly-comes from 
that fact. Each time a district judge decides an issue, the judge is speaking on 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (or, in appropriate cases, the Federal Circuit), the Supreme 

Court of Ohio, and this Court."). 

124 E.g., In re Aspinwall's Estate, 90 F. 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1898) (Bradford, J., concurring) 

("There can be no doubt that a departure would have been taken with even less hesitation 





125 Arakaki v. Cayetano, 299 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1094 n.3 (D. Haw. 2002) ("[A]n unpub­

lished federal district court decision has no more and no less force and effect than a pub­

lished federal district court decision."); Smith v. Astrue, 639 F. Supp. 2d 836, 842 (W.D. 

Mich. 2009) (stating that decision whether to follow "any decisions from outside our circuit, 

published or otherwise" depends on the same criteria); Shannon v. Pleasant Valley Cmty. 

Living Arrangements, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 426, 429-30 n.8 (W.D. Pa. 2000) ("It is well­

settled that a district court opinion, even when published, has no precedential value ...."). 

Contra In re Phipps, 217 B.R. 427, 431-32 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1998). 

126 Vertext Surgical, Inc. v. Paradigm Biodevices, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 2d 226, 234 (D. Mass. 

2009); Welch v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 649 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1224 (D. Kan. 2009). 

But see C & H Sugar Co. v. Solstice Indus., No. 05-CV-74265, 2007 WL 2870991, at *1 

(E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2007). 

127 Vertext Surgical, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 234 (quoting Presentation of Portrait of Hon. Wil­

liam G. Young, 505 F. Supp. 2d XLV, LVII (D. Mass. 2006) (remarks of Young, J.)); cf 

Andrew P. Morriss et al., Signaling and Precedent in Federal District Court Opinions, 13 

SUP. CT. EcoN. REV. 63 (2005) (arguing that district judges are likely to write opinions as a 

way of seeking elevation to the circuit court bench). 

128 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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behalf of the entire district court, 129 just as the judges assigned to a circuit 
panel speak for the entire circuit. Judges later exercising the power of the court 
may look to what the court has previously said when resolving new cases. As 
one district court explained, "In this District, we have five District Judges but 
only one United States District Court. When the Court speaks through one of 
the Judges, the decision should be followed by his colleagues unless it is clearly 
wrong."130 
Structurally, circuit courts and district courts occupy analogous positions 
within the federal judiciary. Both are "inferior courts" under the Constitution, 
equally dependent on statute for their existence and their jurisdiction.131 No 
language in the Constitution or specific statutes gives stare decisis power to 
circuit courts or forbids such power to district courts. Thus, it follows logically 
that district courts would be authorized to the same extent as circuit courts to 
create precedent and assign it whatever weight they deem appropriate, as long 
as they do not create any conflict with their obligations to adhere to vertical 
stare decisis. 132 
The similar historical stare decisis practices of circuit and district courts 
confirm that both have similar authority to employ stare decisis. 133 At one time, 
both types of courts extended significant, but less than binding, deference to 
their own precedent on the basis of stare decisis. 134 There is no reason why 
stare decisis practices could not converge once more. 
129 28 U.S.C. § 132(c) (2006). One court suggested that, in fact, each district judge is its 
own district court. See Ramos v. Boehringer Manheim Corp., 896 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (S.D. 
Fla. 1994) ("Despite plaintiff's assertion, we are not the same court as Judge Aronovitz."). 
This is incorrect (and a little strange-the court even used the royal "we"). By statute, Con­
gress has provided that in each judicial district "[t]here shall be ... a district court which 
shall be a court of record known as the United States District Court for the district." 28 
U.S.C. § 132(a). These courts "shall consist of the district judge or judges for the district in 
regular active service." 28 U.S.C. § 132(b). These provisions suggest that there is a single 
district court in each district, notwithstanding the multiple judges that may be on the court. 
Other opinions have suggested that decisions issued by individual judges are not on behalf of 
the court as a whole. See Johnson v. Smith, 810 F. Supp. 235, 237 (N.D. Ill. 1992) ("Another 
decision by another district judge is not one 'decided by this Court,' either literally or in 
legal effect."); First of Am. Bank v. Gaylor (In re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236, 242 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 1991) ("[I]t must be recognized that a decision rendered by an individual judge in a 
multi-judge district simply does not constitute a decision of the district court itself."). The 
fact that not all judges do not participate in any particular exercise of judicial power does not 
mean that it is not on behalf of the court. The statute clearly authorizes individual judges to 
wield the judicial power vested in the district court, 28 U.S.C. § 132(c) ("[T]he judicial 
power of a district court with respect to any action, suit or proceeding may be exercised by a 
single judge, who may preside alone ...."),just as three-judge panels on the circuit court 
speak for the circuit court. The entire basis for district judges' authority comes from their 
exercise of the district's judicial power. 
130 E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 174 F. Supp. 99, 121 (N.D. Ohio 1959). 
131 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 46, with 28 U.S.C. § 137. 
132 Alexander v. Davis, 282 F. Supp. 2d 609, 611 (W.D. Mich. 2003) ("[T]here is no reason 
to understand stare decisis much differently in the district courts.") (emphasis omitted); Har­
rison, supra note 5, at 518 ("The natural inference is that if rules of stare decisis result from 
the nature of courts or of the judicial power, the rules of horizontal stare decisis should be 
the same for all federal courts, too."). 
133 See supra Part II. 
134 Id. 
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Thus, "[i]t certainly stands to reason that a district court itself could also 
adopt a stare decisis policy."135 As Judge Kozinski wrote for the Ninth Circuit: 
That the binding authority principle [of law of the circuit] applies only to appellate 
decisions, and not to trial court decisions, is yet another policy choice. There is noth­
ing inevitable about this; the rule could just as easily operate so that the first district 
judge to decide an issue within a district ... would bind all similarly situated district 
judges, but it does not. 136 
The Supreme Court also has arguably ratified at least some form of a 
horizontal stare decisis policy at the district court level.137 In the course of 
describing the benefits of a ruling more cited for its implications concerning 
patent law, the Court suggested that treating a particular "issue[] as purely 
legal will promote (though it will not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty 
through the application of stare decisis on those questions not yet subject to 
interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority of the single appeals 
court."138 In another case, the Supreme Court recognized the law-making func­
tion of district courts, unanimously concluding that judicial precedents have 
value to the legal community as a whole, and district court opinions should not 
be vacated simply because the parties entered into a settlement agreement call­
ing for vacatur.139 
The matter would seem to be settled, but for authority to the contrary from 
the Seventh Circuit (which, as noted above, also rejects the law of the cir­
cuit).140 Through Judge Posner, the court stated that "district judges in this 
circuit must not treat decisions by other district judges, in this and a fortiori in 
other circuits, as controlling."141 It eviscerated the idea of any deference, stat­
ing, "Such decisions will normally be entitled to no more weight than their 
intrinsic persuasiveness merits."142 
Though it included needlessly broad language, the opinion did not deal 
with horizontal stare decisis, but with the distinct issue of whether the district 
court erred by giving binding weight to an opinion from a different district 
court in a different circuit.143 (As dicta, the observations on district court stare 
decisis enjoy no stare decisis weight themselves.) Notwithstanding, the opinion 
suggests that district courts may not give any deference to their own precedent 
because doing so would interfere with the district court's duty to declare the 
135 Nat'l Sign & Signal v. Livingston (In re Livingston), 379 B.R. 711, 725 n.16 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 2007), rev'd on other grounds, 422 B.R. 645, 658-59 (W.D. Mich. 2009). 

136 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1174 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Johns v. Redeker, 406 

F.2d 878, 882 (8th Cir. 1969); Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709, 717-18 (8th Cir. 1964). 

Omitted from this quote is the suggestion that district judges could bind all other district 

judges in the circuit. It is true that this could be adopted as a matter of policy, but, as I have 

argued, it would not be a stare decisis policy. 

137 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 391 (1996). 

138 Id. (emphasis omitted). 

139 U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26, 28-29 (1994). 





143 In Colby, the decision under review came from the Northern District of Illinois, while 
the precedent came from the Eastern District of Michigan, which is within the Sixth Circuit. 
Id. at 1122, 1124. 
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law144 and give each individual litigant a day in court.145 If true, this would be 
fatal to any district court stare decisis, but this reasoning does not withstand 
scrutiny.146 Litigants come to court encumbered by many legal rules, including 
Supreme Court precedent and circuit court precedent, yet applying these rules 
to a litigant's case represents not the abandonment, but the fulfillment, of a 
judge's duty. 147 Moreover, this objection would be equally fatal to horizontal 
stare decisis practices at the circuit court level, but circuit court stare decisis 
practices are universally unchallenged. 
Yet it must be conceded that the district court's authority to develop prece­
dent succumbs to the supervisory power of appellate courts, which presumably 
could insist upon or prohibit a particular horizontal stare decisis practice.148 
Several circuits have indicated that there is no law of the district, but these 
statements are not to the contrary as they are descriptive rather than proscrip­
tive.149 In other words, the circuit court opinions note that there is no rule of 
144 See Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 416, 420 (D. Del. 2003) ("[W]hile I have the 
greatest respect for my colleagues in this district, my duty now is to apply the law as fairly 
and logically as I understand it."). 
145 Colby, 811 F.2d at 1124; see also Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Dombeck, 107 F.3d 897, 
900 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that a district court could not be bound to a decision from 
another district court for due process reasons). 
146 See Barrett, supra note 57, at 1027-28 (stating that the opinion "raise[s] more questions 
than [it] answer[s]"). 
147 Some argue that Supreme Court stare decisis in constitutional cases is an abandonment 
of their duty to follow the Constitution. See Lawson, supra note 32, at 3-4, 18-22; Paulsen, 
supra note 32, at 1540-41. If correct, this could undermine even vertical stare decisis, giving 
lower courts free reign to disagree with the Supreme Court. See Lawson, supra, at 8; 
Carninker, supra note 2, at 857. In addition, the judicial system could not function if this 
were the case, with every issue decided anew. Caminker, supra note 2, at 859-60. Moreover, 
while it is the judiciary's duty to determine what the law is, that duty applies to the federal 
judiciary as a whole. Id. at 858. It is completely consistent with this duty to have a single 
court be able to lay down authoritative pronouncements. See id. In any event, it is unlikely 
that any court would reject a practice as integral to the federal judiciary today as vertical 
stare decisis. 
148 For example, a practice adopted by local rule is subject to review by the judicial council 
for the circuit and can be challenged on appeal by a litigant. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) 
(2006). 
149 Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 243 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[A]mong trial 
courts it is unusual for one judge to be bound by the decisions of another and, if it is to 
occur, such a rule should be stated somewhere."); accord Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 
Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430 n.10 (1996) ("If there is a federal district court standard, it must 
come from the Court of Appeals, not from the over forty district court judges in the Southern 
District of New York, each of whom sits alone and renders decisions not binding on the 
others."); ATSI Commc'ns., Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 547 F.3d 109, 112 & n.4 (2d Cir. 
2008); Garcia v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 534 F.3d 1320, 1329 (10th Cir. 2008); Fishman & 
Tobin, Inc. v. Tropical Shipping & Constr. Co., 240 F.3d 956, 965 (11th Cir. 2001) ("Unlike 
circuit court panels where one panel will not overrule another, district courts are not held to 
the same standard." (citation omitted)); Threadgill v. Amlstrong World Indus., 928 F.2d 
1366, 1371 (3d Cir. 1991); Fox v. Acadia State Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991); 
Starbuck v. City & Cnty. of S.F. 556 F.2d 450, 457 n.13 (9th Cir. 1977); Farley v. Farley, 
481 F.2d 1009, 1012 (3d Cir. 1973). 
808 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:787 
binding precedent at the district court level, but at the same time, they do not 
forbid its creation.150 
Indeed, because circuit courts employ de novo review of district court 
judgments on questions of law, regardless of the reason for the error, they 
would rarely have an opportunity to hold that a law-of-the-district rule is inva­
lid.151 In any event, to the extent that these cases do actually forbid law of the 
district-only one aspect of horizontal stare decisis-they do not interfere with 
the general power to adopt other, even strong, stare decisis practices. When 
circuit courts have been squarely confronted with district court stare decisis­
for example when assessing whether a litigant has the authority to intervene as 
of right because he or she "is so situated that disposing of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede the movant' s ability to protect its inter­
est"152-the courts of appeals have recognized that stare decisis can exist 
among district courts.153 
There are reasons to expect circuit courts to leave it up to districts to deter­
mine their own stare decisis practices. Notably, circuit courts adopted their own 
policies without Supreme Court intervention154 and strongly resisted attempts 
by others to interfere with the weight given to precedent.155 This reflects a 
general principle that stare decisis is a decision that is best left to the court at 
issue, within broad bounds of reasonableness. 156 Each court is uniquely quali­
fied to decide what level of deference to give its own opinions. Each court 
understands the practicalities and politics present in the district and can weigh 
the policy considerations accordingly. Thus, unless and until this power is 
removed from them, district courts have the authority to adopt a wide range of 
horizontal stare decisis practices. 
But should they exercise this power? 
150 E.g., McGinley v. Houston, 361 F.3d 1328, 1331 (1 lth Cir. 2004) (noting the "general 

rule" that stare decisis by district courts is not binding but requires that great weight be given 

to prior decisions). 

151 See Alexander v. Davis, 282 F. Supp. 2d 609, 611 (W.D. Mich. 2003) ("While the Sixth 

Circuit has not directly applied this rule to district court precedent (precisely because it has 

had no reason to do so since it is not bound by district court precedent) ...."); cf Mast, 

Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 489 (1900). 

152 FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a). 

153 See WildEarth Guardians v. Nat'l Park Serv., 604 F.3d 1192, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010) 

(allowing intervention as of right based on stare decisis effect of district court judgment); 

Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310 (11th Cir. 2004); Coal. of Ariz./N.M. 

Cntys. for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep't of Interior, 100 F.3d 837, 844 (10th Cir. 1996) 

("[T]he stare decisis effect of the district court's judgment is sufficient impairment for inter­

vention ...."); cf. Fox v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 519 F.3d 1298, 1304 (11th Cir. 2008) (disal­

lowing intervention because ruling was factual and would not have stare decisis effect). 

154 Cf Mast, Foods & Co., 177 U.S. at 489 ("It is scarcely necessary to say, however, that 

when the case reaches this court we should not reverse the action of the court below if we 

thought it correct upon the merits, though we were of opinion it had not given sufficient 

weight to the doctrine of comity."); Brill v. Peckham Motor Truck & Wheel Co., 189 U.S. 





155 See supra note 53. 

156 See Nat'l Sign & Signal v. Livingston (In re Livingston), 379 B.R. 711, 724 (Bankr. 

W.D. Mich. 2007) ("Modem stare decisis does not exist apart from the court. It exists only at 
the court's pleasure."). 
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IV. THE CASE FOR LAW OF THE DISTRICT 
There has been virtually no attention by courts, and still less by the schol­
arship, as to what type of stare decisis a district court should follow. 157 Moving 
down the federal judicial hierarchy, different institutional characteristics lead to 
a different balance of goals. 158 Like the Supreme Court, circuit courts believe 
the benefits of following their own precedents outweigh the costs of allowing a 
"wrong" decision to remain law. In addition, collegiality, which is not a basis 
for stare decisis at the Supreme Court, becomes an important rationale for stare 
decisis at the lower courts where decisions are not made by all judges of the 
court. 159 Despite differences between the circuit and district courts, these poli­
cies also support district court stare decisis practices. 
This Part proposes that district courts adopt a particularly strong horizontal 
stare decisis practice. Predictability, fairness, appearance of justice, judicial 
economy, and collegiality weigh strongly in favor of stare decisis, while the 
costs of having an "incorrect" district court decision bind the district court are 
minimal. The district courts' position within the federal judicial hierarchy­
trial courts most days but appellate courts on others-leaves district courts 
fully able to exercise the responsibility of creating precedent commensurate 
with their location. 
A. The Proposal 
For purposes of argument, consider a law-of-the-district rule that mirrors 
the law of the circuit. 160 Each individual district judge can decide whether to 
mark that judge's written opinion for publication, subject to certain criteria. 
Some courts may allow litigants to have a say in the publication decision, and 
some courts may ask that opinions be circulated around the bench in advance 
when feasible, but these features are wholly up to the individual court. Once an 
opinion is designated as published, every other judge in that district follows its 
holdings until and unless an intervening circuit or Supreme Court decision 
upsets it. 
A natural complement to a strong stare decisis policy is an en bane proce­
dure that would allow all judges of the court to announce the entire court's 
position on an issue. 161 Currently, district court en bane proceedings are 
extremely rare, which could be a reflection of the minimal weight placed on the 
157 See Harrison, supra note 5, at 518. 
158 Caminker, supra note 2, at 865 ("[M]any courts and scholars erroneously suggest that a 
single rationale accounts for present doctrine in its entirety. In fact, none is both intrinsically 
compelling and applicable at every level of the Article III hierarchy. Instead, a persuasive 
account of the doctrine must mix and match various rationales and employ them at different 
places in the judicial hierarchy."). 
159 This is not to say that collegiality is unimportant at the Supreme Court, but that it is not 

implicated by stare decisis policies. 

160 See supra Part II.A. 

161 This is not to say that it is a necessary component of strong stare decisis. Senior judges 

and those judges sitting by designation wield the circuit court power when they sit, and yet 

they are often excluded from participation in en bane proceedings. E.g., 6th Cir. 1.0.P. 35(a). 
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district's precedent.162 En bane proceedings vest final control over stare decisis 
precedent with the court as a whole, and not one particular judge or panel. It 
provides an opportunity for the court to keep its law in conformity with the 
views of a majority of its judges and eliminates the inevitable inconsistent opin­
ions.163 It also provides a "credible threat" to reverse a decision that strays 
from the law of the district. 164 
There is no doubt that district courts can proceed en banc.165 While there 
is no explicit statutory authorizations for district court en bane proceedings like 
those that exist for circuit courts, 166 courts have the power to proceed en bane 
unless Congress forbids the practice. 167 There is ample authority that Congress 
meant to leave this power undisturbed.168 However, while en bane district 
courts do occur, the infrequency of en bane district courts has led to an unde­
veloped procedural terrain, where litigants and judges alike are unaware of 
"how they are initiated, the reasons why they are convened, [and] the number 
of judges on them and their effect."169 With the rise of the law of the district, 
en bane district court proceedings become more important, and district courts 
could take the opportunity to detail the circumstances and procedures gov­
erning their use. Some districts may want to allow en bane proceedings at any 
stage of a case to correct serious problems that might otherwise follow if the 
case is set on the wrong path. 170 Other districts may share the circuit courts' 
view of en bane proceedings as a disfavored chore171 and only provide for en 
bane in limited circumstances. Whatever the particular en bane procedure that a 
162 See John R. Bartels, United States District Courts En Banc - Resolving the Ambiguities, 
73 JUDICATURE 40, 40-41 (1989). 

163 The court may not want to wait for vertical precedent before proceeding en bane. Cf 

Midlock v. Apple Vacations W., Inc., 406 F.3d 453, 458 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Often the different 

[district court] judges will render inconsistent decisions, and it may be years before the 

conflict is ironed out by an appellate decision."). 

164 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 133 (1996) 

(describing en bane proceedings by circuit courts). 

165 See Bartels, supra note 162, at 40-41; see also United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 

289, 293 (S.D. Fla. 1980). 

166 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006), with 28 U.S.C. § 132(c). 

167 Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Comm'r, 314 U.S. 326, 332-33 (1941) (authorizing circuit 

courts to proceed en bane even though statute did not explicitly authorize it). 

168 See Bartels, supra note 162, at 40-41 (citing legislative history and cases); see also W. 

Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250-51 (1953); TCF Film Corp. v. 

Gourley, 240 F.2d 711, 714 (3d Cir. 1957) ("Every district court has the power to review in 

bane a decision rendered by one of its individual members and upon such reconsideration by 

the full bench to overrule the prior decision of the single judge."). 

169 Bartels, supra note 162, at 42. 

170 The en bane proceeding in United States v. Anaya provides a good example. The court 

granted dozens of criminal defendants' motions to dismiss charges on the basis that the 

government's reading of the statute was flawed. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. at 293, 299. Reaching 

this conclusion early in the proceeding is clearly preferable from a perspective of judicial 

economy (to say notlring of fairness to defendants). Other examples may involve certain 

discovery issues, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (en bane to assess 

scope of work-product protections), rev'd, 153 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945), aff'd, 329 U.S. 495 

(1947), class certification, or whether statutory prerequisites to filing (like 28 U.S.C. § 1915 

(2006) apply to a particular lawsuit). 

171 See infra note 211. 
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district adopts, this possibility ensures that the entire court has the final say 
over its precedent. 
B. The Policies 
1. Predictability 
The law of the circuit provides considerable predictability for all cases 
where vertical precedent does not bind the circuit court. Once a published deci­
sion is issued, all concerned parties within the circuit's scope can safely expect 
the decision will be applied to their case. Thus, for individuals and courts 
within the jurisdiction of the circuit, being able to rely on circuit law bolsters 
informed decision making. 172 
However, circuit law is subject to being overturned by the circuit en bane 
or by the Supreme Court. As a result, circuit court decisions deserve less reli­
ance than decisions issued by the Supreme Court. 173 Yet, the infrequency of 
further review insulates much circuit law for long periods of time. 174 
The law of the district would also further predictability. 175 The general 
practice among district courts of extending little or no deference makes it 
impossible to predict which legal rule will be applied to one's case when the 
circuit court is silent on an issue. 176 For a number of relatively minor cases, 
where the economic incentives to appeal an adverse ruling are not present, the 
district court may be the only decision maker. 177 Without the law of the district, 
a litigant will learn which judge is assigned to the case (and, consequently, 
which law applies) during litigation, far too late to conform behavior to that 
judge's view of the law. 
Moreover, current district court stare decisis practices are unclear to the 
point of being unpredictable. When stare decisis is applied inconsistently, it 
provides no assurance to the wary litigant. A clear, public stare decisis rule 
would benefit both judges and litigants. 
172 Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intracircuit Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown 
of the Rule ofLaw: A Response to Estreicher and Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801, 807 (1990) ("A 
system in which panels were free to overturn prior panels would allow the law within each 
circuit to be in constant flux, and would deprive the circuits of their ability to provide clear 
direction to parties and the lower courts."); Hellman, supra note 2, at 698-700; Wasby, 
supra note 58, at 1344 (arguing that intracircuit inconsistency "is a problem because lawyers 
advising their clients have difficulty deciding which precedents to follow and district court 
judges are unsure what rules to apply in the cases they must decide"). 
173 Barrett, supra note 57, at 1063-64. 




175 Peterson v. BASF Corp., 12 F. Supp. 2d 964, 970 (D. Minn. 1998) (stare decisis furthers 

"considerable interests of consistency, and predictability of result"). 

176 See Levin, supra note 3, at 993-94. 

177 For example, cases brought under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (or for other 

statutory violations) involve relatively modest damages for each violation. 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692k(a) (2006) (providing for actual damages and up to $1000 in additional damages). 
These cases often involve repeated, highly-similar action (say, a provision in a bill sent to 
hundreds of consumers) where a definitive district court ruling would provide needed clarity 
to those trying to comply with their statutory obligations. 
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2. Fairness 
Stare decisis by circuit courts is strongly compelled by the desire to treat 
similarly-situated litigants in the same way, more so than stare decisis by the 
Supreme Court. Because of the justices' long tenure, the Supreme Court 
changes its mind slowly and somewhat rarely (even in the absence of stare 
decisis). 178 Oftentimes, a court composed of the same members will decide the 
same legal issue in the same way, even when presented with it repeatedly. 179 In 
contrast, without stare decisis among circuit courts, two identical litigants could 
have their cases decided in the same week by the same court with different 
results, solely because of the differing views of the judges. 
Both circuit courts and district courts rely on random assignment to match 
cases with judges.180 When there is serious disagreement between district 
judges on a legal issue and there is no horizontal stare decisis, the applicable 
law depends solely on the judge assigned. This in tum relies on a process func­
tionally the same as a lottery or a flip of a coin. 181 "[T]here is something partic­
ularly unfair about the outcome of a case turning upon a computer's random 
selection of judges within [the] same building."182 Stare decisis constrains this 
arbitrariness by minimizing luck through maximizing precedent. Of course, 
some differences between judges will remain despite stare decisis, but at least 
the rule of law would be uniform. 183 
It must be conceded that even under a law of the district, randomness will 
persist on legal questions. First, unpublished opinions allow similarly-situated 
litigants to be treated differently, as is the case at the courts of appeals. This is 
the consequence of a tradeoff of fairness concerns: between equal treatment on 
one hand and the imposition of ill-considered law on the other. Second, random 
assignments determine which judge presides over the earliest case presenting a 
legal issue. However, barring a judge who simply cannot be trusted to fashion 
fair or reasonable (even if "incorrect") rules of law, this form of randomness is 
arguably less invidious because all litigants are at least treated equally, even if 
the ruling is not ultimately upheld. 
178 See William W. Berry III, Repudiating Death, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 441, 442 
(2011). 

179 See id. ("It is a rare occurrence for a Supreme Court Justice to reverse his or her stance 

on a particular issue."). 

180 Obert v. Republic W. Ins. Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d 279, 290 (D. R.I. 2002) ("[R]andom 
assignment is an important innovation in the judiciary, facilitated greatly by the presence of 
computers ...."); J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral Assignment of Judges 
at the Court ofAppeals, 78 TEx. L. REv. 1037, 1069, 1074 (2000) ("All circuits purport to 
use a system of random assignment of judges and cases."); Adam M. Samaha, Randomiza­
tion in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 47 (2009) ("Today the process of 
assigning cases to judges is pervaded with lotteries."). Many districts have an exception for 
related cases. 
181 See Samaha, supra note 180, at 54. 





183 See infra Part IV.C.3. 
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3. Appearance of Justice 
Appearance of justice requires that it appear that a court is expounding law 
separate and distinct from its judges. At the level of the Supreme Court, justices 
serve on the Court for long periods of time and all justices vote in almost every 
case. In contrast, generally only a subset of the judges of a lower court decide 
each case that comes before that court. 184 This makes it more difficult to pre­
serve the idea of a court larger than the individual judge or judges who decide a 
particular case. 185 The litigant and the public might well question the legiti­
macy of a legal system whose rules appear to depend on chance and on 
personality. 
The appearance of justice rationale acquires a new force at the district 
court level. For most cases, a district judge will be the primary-and indeed, 
may be the only-human face of the judicial system. Through status confer­
ences, settlement negotiations, multiple motions, and oral arguments, district 
judges are far more engaged with cases and litigants than circuit judges.186 
These numerous interactions provide greater opportunity for the judge's per­
sonality to come through, which may make it difficult for the public and liti­
gants to maintain the belief that the judge is deciding the case based on law and 
not personal preference. 
Too often at the district court level, the attention is unduly focused on the 
judicial officer and not the law. Litigants have been known to manipulate case 
assignment practices at the district court level through refilling cases, 187 mark­
ing them as companion or related cases, 188 or seeking a recusal, 189 when con­
fronted with a "bad draw."190 These practices-which are severely criticized 
by courts-reflect a view among litigants that their case depends on the judge 
assigned. 191 When one judge refuses to follow the decision of another judge on 
the court, this view is confirmed. 
184 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) & (c) (2006) (providing for three judge panels at the circuit court); 28 
U.S.C. § 132(c) (authorizing a single judge to exercise power of district court); cf Dobbins, 

supra note 2, at 1465. 

185 See White, supra note 69, at 673 (law of the circuit "helps to avoid a perception that a 

result depends upon the composition of the panel."). 

186 Levin, supra note 3, at 978. 

187 In re Fieger, 191 F.3d 451, No. 97-1359, 1999 WL 717991, at *1 (6th Cir. Sept. 10, 

1999) (upholding sanction against attorney for filing thirteen similar lawsuits in a single 

district, and dismissing all but the suit before the judge he wanted); Vaqueria Tres Monjitas, 

Inc. v. Rivera Cubano, 341 F. Supp. 2d 69, 72 (D.P.R 2004). 

188 See, e.g., Rite-Aid Corp. v. Am. Exp. Travel Related Servs. Co., 2008 WL 3155063, at 

*3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2008); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 2002 WL 31100839, at *1 

(D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2002). 

189 In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 956 (1 lth Cir. 2003) (discussing a litigant who 

hired a particular law firm to force a judge's recusal); United States v. El-Gabrowny, 844 F. 

Supp. 955, 958-59 (S.D. N.Y. 1994) ("[R]ecusal motions should not be allowed to be used 

as 'strategic devices to judge shop."' (quoting Lamborn v. Dittmer, 726 F. Supp. 510, 515 

(S.D. N.Y. 1989))). 

190 An extreme example is outright manipulation of the assignment process by a clerk, 





191 See Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for a Venue: The Need for More Limits on 

Choice, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267, 300 (1996) ("[A]llowing judge-shopping would invite 

public skepticism of the ability to receive justice in our court system and would cheapen the 
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The focus on judge-shopping is well illustrated by a case from the South­
ern District of Florida.192 Several, but not all, judges of the district court had 
concluded that an organization (a frequent litigant) lacked standing to bring 
lawsuits to enforce the Americans with Disabilities Act. 193 When the organiza­
tion lost, it would refile a virtually identical case in the hopes of obtaining a 
judge who felt differently.194 Although the district had a rule requiring counsel 
to inform the court if a case was related to an earlier one, the organization did 
not do so. 195 The district court's failure to articulate a legal rule for the district 
on the contested issue led the litigant to focus on getting a favorable judge 
assigned, rather than to focus on the law. The law of the district redirects atten­
tion back to the law and away from attempts to manipulate judicial 
assignment. 196 
4. Judicial Economy 
The concerns of judicial economy identified by the Supreme Court are 
amplified considerably for lower courts. The Supreme Court-which considers 
fewer than 100 cases a year-finds it difficult to revisit precedent. This diffi­
culty is multiplied several times over in the circuit court where there are con­
siderably more cases. 
It is also costly even to consider overruling precedent. 197 The Supreme 
Court, which does overrule its precedent from time to time, need not delve into 
a lengthy analysis of each precedent's viability in every case. 198 Rather, 
through its certiorari jurisdiction, it selects cases and issues that allow it to 
reconsider precedent on its own time. 199 When the Court decides that a previ­
ous decision may be in jeopardy, it often asks the parties to brief whether pre­
judicial process."). Such manipulation attempts are rarely seen at the circuit court level, but, 
at the Supreme Court, they do tend to pop up again through requests for recusal. See Sher­
rilyn A. Ifill, Do Appearances Matter?: Judicial Impartiality and the Supreme Court in Bush 
v. Gore, 61 Mo. L. REv. 606, 618 n.61 (2002). A likely explanation is that there is greater 
room for manipulation of judicial assignments at the district court level than at the circuit 
court. 
192 See Disability Advocates & Counseling Grp., Inc. v. Betancourt, 379 F.Supp.2d 1343 
(S.D. Fla. 2005). 
193 Id. at 1345. 
194 Id. at 1346. 
195 Id. at 1348. The court imposed sanctions on plaintiff for the valid reason that plaintiff 
violated the local rule in an attempt to judge-shop. But the court also rested its imposition of 
sanctions on the fact that plaintiff did not appeal adverse rulings, which it considered to be 
part of the general judge-shopping scheme. Id. at 1346, 1362-63. This is not a defensible 
position. The right to appeal is also the right not to appeal, and litigants should be able to do 
so for any reason without having nefarious reasons imputed to them. 
196 Mills v. Apfel, No. Civ. 99-27-P-H, 2000 WL 761796, at *l (D. Me. Mar. 16, 2000) 
("[I]t is good practice for the judges of a District to follow each other's decision so as to 
avoid judge-shopping ...."). 
197 See Paulsen, supra note 32, at 1545 ("Unless stare decisis is an absolute rule-relieving 
courts even of the obligation of thinking about the prior thinking-the disposition function 
of precedent ('the obligation to follow precedent') does not relieve the judiciary of the need 
to 'eye[ ] each issue afresh in every case' in which it arises."). 
198 See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years 
After the Judges' Bill, 100 CowM. L. REV. 1643, 1718 n.431 (2000). 
199 Id. at 1718 & n.431. 
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cedent should be overruled.200 The Court must still confront petitions 
questioning precedent, but it can dispose of these quickly and without explana­
tion if it so chooses through a simple denial of certiorari.201 
The circuit court accomplishes the same goal through the use of the law of 
the circuit and discretionary en bane panels. It would be unduly time-consum­
ing for each individual three-judge panel to analyze whether precedent should 
be overruled or not. By forbidding panels from overturning circuit law, the law 
of the circuit saves the panels from this expense. 202 Those arguments instead 
must be made to the circuit on rehearing en banc.203 The en bane court can 
leave precedent in place without providing an explanation by declining to 
rehear a case-much as the Supreme Court does with its denials of 
certiorari.204 
Stare decisis by district courts would also further judicial economy. Dis­
trict judges have more cases than circuit court judges,205 and have the added 
burden of dealing with many litigants' kitchen-sink approach to pleading, 
where only a few of the many legal theories advanced are promoted with a 
straight face, and even fewer will be appealed.206 Moreover, district courts 
must handle the day-to-day burdens of managing a case: scheduling, monitor­
ing discovery, dealing with evidentiary issues, and, if necessary, overseeing 
trial. As a result of these numerous demands, conservation of judicial resources 
is particularly important at the district court level. Often, the case will be con­
trolled by vertical precedent; when it is not, requiring each district judge to 
individually wrestle with questions of law already tackled by a colleague 
wastes valuable judging time.207 
200 See Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009) (directing parties to file supplemen­

tal briefs on whether the Court should overrule two prior decisions). 

201 See Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200, 126 S.Ct. 2873, 2874 (2006) (Ste­

vens, J., statement) ("The doctrine of stare decisis provides a sufficient basis for the denial 

of certiorari in these cases."). 

202 Some courts have gone so far as to deem as "frivolous" any argument that is foreclosed 

by binding circuit precedent. E.g., Labosco v. Purdy, 232 F.3d 211, No. 00-40187, 2000 WL 

1273550, at *l (5th Cir. Aug. 24, 2000) (per curiam). This practice is unsound, as presenting 

an argument that will lose at lower courts is required to preserve the issue for appeal to the 

Supreme Court. Even when the Supreme Court has decided an issue, the chance always 

exists that the Supreme Court will revisit the issue, and the unhappy litigant who does not 

raise an argument foreclosed by circuit precedent will not get the benefit if that precedent is 

overturned. See United States v. Vanorden, 414 F.3d 1321, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2005) 

(Tjoflat, J., concurring). 

203 See supra Part II.A. 

204 Cf Reynolds & Richman, supra note 62, at 1201 ("The use of the non-publication rule 





205 In 2010, 335 appeals were filed per circuit court judge, while 417 cases were com­

menced per district court judge. Federal Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 

JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2012); see ADMIN. 







206 See Ernest E. Svenson & S. Ann Saucer, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 40 LoY. 

L. REV. 697, 708 (1995). 

207 Cf EEOC v. Pan Am. World Airways, 576 F. Supp. 1530, 1535-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) 

("No jurisprudential purpose will be served, and scarce judicial resources on all levels will 
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Of course, like the law of the circuit, the law of the district would come 
with its own burdens on judicial resources. Because publication is optional, the 
added efforts of producing a precedential opinion, if any,208 would be borne 
only by district judges who have the inclination, time, and other resources to 
publish.209 Similarly, it would take judges of future disputes time to find addi­
tional sources of controlling authority, but this burden would be shared by 
advocates, who must bring all such controlling authority to the court's atten­
tion.210 The law of the district also would cost less than building the law from 
scratch.211 
5. Collegiality 
There is one policy that is arguably furthered by stare decisis in the lower 
courts (where a decision is announced by a fraction of the court's judges) that is 
not implicated by stare decisis at the Supreme Court: collegiality amongst 
judges. Some circuit judges posit that collegiality among the court suffers if 
be wasted if we, and every other district judge who happens to have an Equal Pay Act or 
ADEA lawsuit on his or her docket should immediately woo the Muse and set down a 
lengthy opinion having the same 50-50 chance of being right as the Allstate opinion has."). 
208 Although some believe that circuit courts place more effort into binding precedent, see, 
e.g., PosNER, supra note 164, at 165-66; Levin, supra note 3, at 1000; infra note 243, this 
view is not universally shared, see Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of the System of 
Precedent: Selective Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
109, 124 (1995) ("No empirical study has confirmed the claim that selective publication 
saves time."). 
209 See Caminker, supra note 2, at 848. Unlike circuit courts, which by practice today 
resolve nearly all appeals with some sort of written opinion, however brief, only a tiny 
fraction of district court legal rulings are memorialized by district judges in reasoned opin­
ions at all, and only a subset of these make it to Westlaw or LEXIS (to say nothing of being 
reported in a reporter). See Levin, supra note 3, at 976; David A Hoffman et al., Dock­
etology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REv. 681, 704-05 (2007). When 
deciding whether to undertake the cost of writing a reasoned opinion, district judges may 
consider the likelihood that a ruling will be appealed. See id. at 704-05 (finding evidence 
that district judges may be more likely to write opinions in cases likely to be appealed); see 
also id. at 695 (quoting a district judge and a bankruptcy judge, and stating, "If opinions are 
necessary at all, most [trial-level] judges explain them as persuasive writings directed at 
higher courts"). For those rulings likely to be appealed, district judges already input the time 
to create a reasoned opinion to withstand appellate scrutiny. Therefore, it is unlikely that 
there is any additional cost to making an opinion precedential as well. 
210 See MooEL RuLEs OF PRoF.'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2006) (attorneys must disclose 
"legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to 
the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel"). 
211 Moreover, depending on the precise contours of the policy enacted, district court judges 
could be forced to review en bane petitions. Many circuit judges disfavor reviewing en bane 
petitions, and district judges would likely share that sentiment. Richard Arnold, Why Judges 
Don't Like Petitions for Rehearing, 3 J. APP. PRAc. & PRornss 29, 37 (2001) ("[O]n many 
days, I confess, I find myself wishing that there were no such thing."); Wasby, supra note 
58, at 1354 (quoting a circuit judge stating that proceeding en bane "'takes a tremendous 
number of hours'"). Although most litigants aggrieved by final judgment may not bother to 
seek discretionary en bane when an appeal as of right is available to them, a district court 
that allows en bane petitions before final judgment during a case could be forced to dispose 
of petitions challenging every adverse ruling, even on non-dispositive issues. The scope of 
district court en bane practices is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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one panel refuses to adhere to another's decision.212 Collegiality, in tum, is 
believed to result in better judging,213 and if nothing else, a more pleasant 
working environment for the judges. 
The threat to collegiality from intracourt disagreement is overstated. 
Panels ignore unpublished circuit precedent, as they may under the law of the 
circuit, yet it is accepted that this does not create significant discord. It is also 
difficult to understand why a subsequent panel's disagreement with an earlier 
ruling would create greater judicial disharmony than would a dissent in a 
decided case.214 Certainly cordial disagreement amongst judges is to be toler­
ated, expected, and, indeed, cherished. 215 
The real source of disharmony, then, must be from unrealized expecta­
tions.216 If one set of judges gives an earlier decision considerable thought, 
enters a published opinion, and intends it to be the rule going forward, collegi­
ality suffers when another set of judges ignores it. This provides a compelling 
argument for why the stare decisis rules should be well-defined, in advance, so 
each judge's opinion about the precedential weight of his or her opinion is the 
same as later judges'. When the circuit's stare decisis policy-whatever it ends 
up being-is clearly established, judges are less likely to have unrealized 
expectations. This is particularly true when there is "buy-in" from the judges of 
the court, such as through the adoption of a formal rule or an internal operating 
procedure.217 
If collegiality requires the law of the circuit, it seems that it would equally 
require the law of the district. If instead collegiality requires not a particular 
stare decisis practice, but only that a practice be articulated and followed, this 
conclusion too applies to district court practices. Absent a clear rule, some 
judges may believe a certain decision will receive deference while other judges 
may not. A district judge who takes the time to publish a lengthy exposition 
may feel frustrated if it is disregarded by other judges. 
212 Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1639, 1680 & n.136 (2003) ("[J]udges have cited collegiality in support of adher­

ence to circuit precedent and the principle of stare decisis."); see also Barbour v. Int'l Union, 

594 F.3d 315, 340 (4th Cir. 2010) (Hamilton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 

Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1239-40 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2004) (Wilson, J., dissenting) 

(noting the "great deal of disharmony that might result if panels of the Court were constantly 

overturning each other's decisions."). 

213 See generally Edwards, supra note 212, at 1640; Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and 

Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REv. 1335 (1998). 

214 Perhaps the quest for court harmony might explain the adoption of a bright-line rule, 

such as law of the circuit or a rule of no deference. With a clear rule, there is arguably less 

ambiguity about whether a precedent applies or not. Moreover, there may be strain on the 

court if judges were declining to follow each oilier' s decisions on the ground that they were 

"clearly erroneous." Although appealing in theory, in practice even the clear law of the 

circuit rules are subject to manipulation. 

215 To the extent that collegiality causes judges to join or not challenge a colleague's opin­

ion, the quality of judging is actually hampered by collegiality. 

216 See Atl Thermoplastics Co. v. Faytex Corp., 974 F.2d 1279, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 

(Rich, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane) (stating that the decision not to follow 

precedent "is not only insulting to the Scripps panel (Chief Judge Markey, Judge Newman 

and a visiting judge), it is mutiny. It is heresy. It is illegal."). 

217 See FED. R. APP. P. 47. 
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Ideally, the stare decisis policy of a district will be articulated clearly by 
the court as a whole.218 The unilateral assertion by one district judge of a stare 
decisis policy is a path fraught with peril. Other district judges may not agree 
with the policy announced, and as the example of the Western District of Mich­
igan illustrates,219 they may simply refuse to follow the practice articulated, 
sabotaging any hope for collegiality.220 
C. Differences Between Circuit Courts and District Courts 
Although the same policies apply to district courts as circuit courts, there 
are several distinctions between the levels worth considering in greater detail. 
First, litigants have an appeal as of right from final district court decisions, and 
therefore district court opinions are inherently less final. Second, circuits have a 
broader geographic scope, which increases the ability of potential litigants to 
predict which law will apply. Finally, there is a common view that consistency 
is an appropriate consideration only for circuit courts, perhaps based on certain 
institutional advantages those courts possess. While all of these distinctions call 
for a different weighing of goals at the district court level, they still support 
strong horizontal stare decisis by district courts. 
1. Finality 
When the Supreme Court decides an issue, there is no further judicial 
recourse.221 This finality advises against an immutable rule, lest the nation for­
ever be bound to error. A three judge panel of the circuit court is the highest 
court a litigant can access of right.222 In light of the Supreme Court's stingy 
grants of certiorari and the rarity of circuit court en bane proceedings, this is 
likely the ceiling for even the most highly motivated litigant. The absence of 
further error correction makes the law of the circuit a very costly rule.223 
In contrast, district court precedent can be challenged by any aggrieved 
litigant through an appeal as of right to a circuit court, which can consider the 
issue of law de novo. A sufficiently motivated litigant aggrieved by a district 
court opinion would be sure to exercise this right. Yet this right is not as strong 
as it first appears. Litigants may only appeal a narrow class of "final" decisions, 
218 Cf. Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d 240, 243 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("[A]mong 
trial courts it is unusual for one judge to be bound by the decisions of another and, if it is to 
occur, such a rule should be stated somewhere."); S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 
1370 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en bane) ("It is appropriate that the court adopt its substantive law 
precedents in a judicial decision accompanied by a published opinion."). 
219 See supra Part 11.B. 
220 Perhaps judges would view stare decisis as a diminishment of their power, but while it 
limits the power of individual judges (when they are bound by precedent), it also increases it 
(when others are bound by their decisions). Thus, we would expect judges concerned with 
their personal judicial power to be indifferent towards any particular stare decisis policy. 
221 See Caminker, supra note 2, at 854. 
222 See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006). 
223 Indeed, law of the circuit is perhaps more rigid than we might predict based on the very 
small likelihood of review by a higher court, and the unavailability of en bane procedures to 
provide the entire circuit's view on every question of law. 
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which usually requires waiting until judgment is entered in the case. 224 It is 
very costly to litigate through an entire district court proceeding, which could 
take years, and then appeal. Even on appeal, the district law stands at least a 
reasonable chance of being affirmed.225 This is why district courts are, for most 
matters, the court of first and last resort, and most cases terminate where they 
started.226 
Notwithstanding barriers to appeal, the fact that appeal remains available 
for any motivated litigant on a dispositive issue of law is certainly a vital dis­
tinction between circuit and district courts.227 Even though incorrect district 
law imposes a cost of time and money on litigants, this cost is less than incor­
rect circuit law, which cannot be further challenged by right, no matter how 
desperately a litigant may want to. The availability of appeal of right allows 
circuit courts to decide many more cases than does the Supreme Court, and this 
activity provides greater opportunity for district court precedent to be rejected. 
"Incorrect" district court decisions-as defined by what the relevant circuit 
court says on an issue-are unlikely to persist for too long. The cost of linger­
ing district court precedent is, therefore, lower than circuit court precedent, and 
a bargain price for the values that come from intracourt consistency. 
The flip side of the ease with which district law may be overturned is that, 
while the costs are lower, so are the benefits. How predictable would the law of 
the district really be? However deeply entrenched district precedent might be, it 
is always susceptible to being upset by the circuit court on an appeal as of right. 
Yet the decisions of even the Supreme Court are susceptible to reconsideration, 
and reliance in them is discounted accordingly. The same is true for circuit 
courts. Shrewd litigants-the sort of litigant who would be aware of district 
court precedent when contemplating an action-know the degree to which dis­
trict court precedent is vulnerable and will take that into account. Moreover, 
other virtues of stare decisis, like fairness and judicial economy, remain strong 
at the district court level despite the availability of appeal. 
The availability of appeal of right poses a different problem: the proposed 
rule could systematically bias repeat litigants such as governmental units and 
major employers.228 When district courts do not create binding precedent, a 
losing litigant will exercise the right to appeal only if it makes economic sense 
224 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006). For example, an order dismissing a case is a final order, but an 
order denying summary judgment usually is not. 
225 U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 16, 28-29 (1994) (noting 
district courts are affirmed most of the time, while the Supreme Court reverses circuit courts 
half of the time). 
226 Levin, supra note 3, at 979. "[A]s one district judge strikingly put it, '[t]he people of this 
district either get justice here with me or they don't get it at all .... Here at the trial court­
that's where the action is."' Id. (quoting C.K. ROWLAND & RoBERT A. CARP, PoLrrrcs AND 
JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 1 (1996)). 
227 See O'Hara, supra note 104, at 773-74 (arguing that appeal of right changes the likeli­
hood of adopting strong stare decisis). 
228 See Slavitt, supra note 208, at 119 (arguing that repeat litigants are able to manipulate 
selective publication regimes by seeking vacatur or depublication of an unfavorable opinion 
or requesting publication of a favorable one); cf Mark C. Weber, Preclusion and Procedural 
Due Process in Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 347, 379 n.123 
(1988) (arguing that the lack of stare decisis effect among district courts "is the basis of 
defendants' frequent disregard of adverse precedent"). 
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in that particular case: that is, the costs of appeal outweigh the costs of adhering 
to the district court judgment and the likelihood of losing again on appeal. 229 
But under a regime with horizontal stare decisis (of any strength, but particu­
larly the law of the district), a repeat litigant will also consider future cases, and 
be more ready to appeal adverse rulings in published opinions than a litigant 
only concerned with the value of the present case. 230 One might hypothesize 
that district court precedent disfavoring repeat litigants would be appealed more 
often-and is therefore more likely subject to being overturned by the circuit­
than precedent in its favor. Over time, this would lead to district law favoring 
repeat litigants, and would bind district judges and future one-time litigants. 
This poses a problem because it exploits an institutional characteristic to artifi­
cially obtain legal rules that benefit one class of litigants over another. 
Should this hypothesis be borne out empirically, it need not be fatal to the 
law of the district. First, the costs imposed are relatively minor, almost by defi­
nition, since a litigant will appeal any loss that causes sufficient damage. This 
cost is further minimized because settled district law can expedite the resolu­
tion of the matter and set up an appeal more quickly than if it is litigated 
through a lengthy proceeding. Further mitigating these minor costs are the other 
virtues of consistency. 
2. Geographical Scope 
Another important distinction is that district courts typically cover a nar­
rower geographic scope than circuit courts. In many cases, venue in a particular 
district will be clear, and therefore the applicable law will be as well.231 But 
this will not always be the case: many actions will be challengeable in multiple 
districts, perhaps because the action covers a broad area, 232 or because the par­
ties to the lawsuit reside in multiple locations.233 Consider, for example, a state 
that wishes to adopt a policy that it believes will be challenged in federal court. 
Only one circuit court will cover that state, but the state is answerable to poten­
tially multiple districts.234 
Inconsistent district law within the geographic scope of some action will 
lead to minimal reliance on district precedent. But this will not always be the 
case, as not every district will weigh in on every issue. Even when districts do 
weigh in, there is a still measure of predictability, as the number of different 
legal rules possible is limited to the number of district courts, rather than dis­
trict judges. 
A bigger problem is the possibility of forum-shopping. Under the law of 
the district, the settled nature of district law gives litigants the opportunity to 
more readily exploit differences between districts. Without the law of the dis­
trict, a litigant might attempt to forum-shop by filing in a district believed to 
have a higher percentage of favorable judges, but he or she will be unable to 
229 See id. 
23 ° Cf. Slavitt, supra note 208, at 119-20. 
231 See 28 U.S.C. § 139l(b) (2006). 
232 Id. § 139l(b)(2). 
233 Id. § 139l(b)(l). 
234 See id. § 1392 ("Any civil action, of a local nature, involving property located in differ­
ent districts in the same State, may be brought in any of such districts."). 
821 Summer 2012] STARE DECISIS IN THE INFERIOR COURTS 
accurately predict which judge, and by extension which legal rule, will apply to 
the lawsuit. Courts mitigate these concerns, albeit incompletely, by allowing 
for consolidation of related cases filed in multiple districts235 and the discre­
tionary transfer of venue,236 and by enforcing rules of personal jurisdiction and 
provisions of contractual clauses.237 Differences that persist can be viewed 
either as the inevitable product of a system with many distinct courts or as 
serving the positive function of allowing experimentation with law. 
Moreover, some district courts have become specialty courts, which will 
attract certain types of cases. For example, the Court of International Trade has 
exclusive jurisdiction over certain trade disputes,238 and the District Court for 
the District of Columbia handles a disproportionate number of challenges under 
the freedom of information act.239 The argument for consistency is even 
stronger among these courts with broad geographic jurisdiction over one partic­
ular subject matter. 
3. Consistency 
Some have posited that consistency is not a proper consideration for dis­
trict courts, and "the responsibility for maintaining the law's uniformity is a 
responsibility of appellate rather than trial judges."240 The objection does not 
explain why appellate courts exclusively have this responsibility. As detailed 
below, more persuasive iterations of this argument-institutional advantages of 
appellate courts and structural advantages of district court disagreement-fall 
flat. 
One possible argument is that there are structural reasons why consistency 
should only exist at higher levels of judicial review. Consistency between 
judges is, in general, less prevalent at the district court level.241 Even if there 
were a strong stare decisis policy, district judges retain considerable discretion 
235 Id. § 1407. 

236 Id. § 1404. 





238 28 U.S.C. §§ 1581-85 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 

239 Keith Anderson, Note, ls There Still a "Sound Legal Basis?": The Freedom oflnfonna­

tion Act in the Post-9/Il World, 64 Omo ST. L.J. 1605, 1631 (2003); see also 5 U.S.C. 

§ 552(a)(4)(B) (2006). 

240 Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811F.2d1119, 1124 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing comity as it 

applies to one court following another court's precedent, and stating: "The reasons we gave 

for giving some though not controlling weight to decisions of other federal courts of appeals 

do not apply to decisions of other district courts, because the responsibility for maintaining 

the law's uniformity is a responsibility of appellate rather than trial judges and because the 

Supreme Court does not assume the burden of resolving conflicts between district judges 

whether in the same or different circuits."); see also Am. Silicon Techs. v. United States, 

261 F.3d 1371, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (district judges need not "march in lockstep" because 

"responsibility for maintaining the law's uniformity is a responsibility of appellate rather 

than trial judges"). But see TMF Tool Co. v. Muller, 913 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) 

("For a variety of quite valid reasons, including consistency of result, it is an entirely proper 





241 See, e.g., footnotes 242-48 and accompanying text. 

822 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:787 
on a wide range of issues,242 including the scope and timing of discovery,243 
certain evidentiary rulings,244 and the imposition of sanctions.245 In addition to 
legal rulings, trial courts often are required to make factual findings that depend 
on highly individualistic assessments of facts such as witness credibility.246 
Judges (like juries) differ in how to translate in-court evidence into an assess­
ment of what actually occurred.247 Perhaps the variance between judges is most 
apparent-and significant-in criminal sentencing decisions, where judges 
have considerable discretion in fashioning a sentence. 248 
It would be a mistake to assume that our acceptance of variation among 
district judges on certain issues implies that consistency on matters of law has 
no value. The issues where differences are most permitted-factual conclusions 
and procedural rulings-are areas where stare decisis practices have never 
applied, at any level. Factual conclusions are not subject to stare decisis 
because the precise facts are rarely subject to multiple lawsuits (except where 
another doctrine, claim preclusion, or res judicata, would apply).249 Procedural 
rulings (another area where variation is most tolerated) usually do not implicate 
reliance interests, making stare decisis considerations less important.250 Appel­
late court review is deferential to these types of rulings, but such rulings do not 
directly affect issues of law, so stare decisis would not come into play. 
242 Beard v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612, 618 (2009) ("[T]he federal system often grants broad 
discretion to the trial judge .... The States seem to value discretionary rules as much as the 
Federal Government does."). 
243 Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 909 (1997) ("Rule 6(a) [of the rules governing habeas 
corpus proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254] makes it clear that the scope and extent of such 
discovery is a matter confided to the discretion of the District Court."); United States v. 
Nixon 418 U.S. 683, 702 (1974) ("Enforcement of a pretrial subpoena duces tecum must 
necessarily be committed to the sound discretion of the trial court ...."). 
244 E.g., Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 (2008) ("[C]ourts of 
appeals afford broad discretion to a district court's evidentiary rulings."); United States v. 
Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984) ("A district court is accorded a wide discretion in determining 
the admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules."). 
245 E.g., Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401-405 (1990) (sanctions under 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1991) (sanctions under 
inherent authority of court). 
246 FED. R. Crv. P. 52(a)(6) ("Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give due regard 
to the trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses' credibility."); Anderson v. City of 
Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75 (1985) (extending clear-error deference beyond credi­
bility determinations). 
247 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, 
and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729 (2010); Dan M. Kahan et 
al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive 
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REv. 837 (2009). The unpredictability of juries frequently 
inspires calls for major reforms to the jury system. 
248 See generally Stephanos Bibas et al., Policing Politics and Sentencing, 103 Nw. U. L. 
REv. 1371 (2009); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Apprendi v. New 
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
249 United States v. Cardales-Luna, 632 F.3d 731, 734 (1st Cir. 2011). 
250 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see also Harris v. United States, 536 
U.S. 545, 572 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[C]onsiderations of stare decisis are at their 
nadir in cases involving procedural rules ...."); Note, Irreparable Injury in Constitutional 
Cases, 46 YALE L.J. 255, 264 (1936) (stare decisis does not apply to discretionary 
decisions). 
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It also might be asserted that because circuit courts generally have four 
institutional advantages over district courts that make them better equipped to 
decide difficult legal issues, and as a result stare decisis is more favored at the 
circuit level than the district level.251 Circuit courts sit in multi-judge panels to 
resolve appeals, whereas only one judge decides cases at the district court 
level.252 By the time a case reaches the circuit court, the number of issues has 
been narrowed to focus on those most in dispute253 (at least if the parties 
retained good advocates).254 Litigants in the circuit court have an extended 
period to brief issues, and do not have the distractions of discovery and other 
trial court proceedings255 (although emergency appeals can also be adjudicated 
through precedent-setting opinions).256 Finally, the circuit court and the parties 
already have had the benefit of one neutral judge working through the legal 
issue,257 (unless the case is filed directly in the court of appeals). In addition, 
although not necessarily a structural defect, today's district courts have many 
cases and legal issues to sort through, which reduces the time judges can spend 
on developing broad rules of law.258 
Assuming that these characteristics enhance a court's ability to declare 
precedent, they are not exclusive to appellate courts in all cases. District courts 
function as appellate courts on occasion, and review opinions from magistrate 
judges or the bankruptcy court.259 In these circumstances, they have the same 
institutional advantages (except for collegial decision-making) that circuit 
courts possess. Thus, for example, when functioning as an appellate court, the 
district court has the benefit of an unbiased judge's reasoning.260 Appeals, 
whether to district judge or circuit court, typically involve a narrowing of the 
issues. The appeals often can be dealt with at the court's schedule (or at least 
without the immediacy of a pending trial). 
When district courts review agency decisions, they effectively function as 
appellate courts, and therefore experience many of the advantages of circuit 
courts.261 Review of an agency decision is typically limited to the factual 




252 See Regina College, 499 U.S. at 232; John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent 

Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 

998 (2002) ("[T]he development of an appellate hierarchy with collegial courts at the higher 

levels ... operates structurally to ensure that no individual judge can, by his or her actions 





253 Regina College, 499 U.S. at 232. 





255 See Regina College, 499 U.S. at 232. 

256 E.g., Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d 1279, 1281 (1 lth Cir. 2010). 

257 See Regina College, 499 U.S. at 232. 

258 See infra Part IV.D. 

259 See infra notes 284-83. 

260 Morgan v. Goldman (In re Morgan), 573 F.3d 615, 624 (8th Cir. 2009) (considering 

whether bankruptcy judge was unbiased as a requirement of due process). 

261 Cf. Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1953) ("The 

position of any administrative tribunal whose hearings, findings, conclusions and orders are 

subject to direct judicial review, is much akin to that of a United States District Court."). 
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record before the agency, dispensing with the distraction of discovery or factual 
development.262 Thus, the district court's typical role is to determine what the 
law is and apply it to the record already compiled, in much the same manner as 
a circuit court would review a district court decision.263 
In a run-of-the-mill case, though, district courts are trial courts, and 
thereby lack these four institutional characteristics of circuit courts.264 But this 
comparative advantage does not make the district court unqualified to articulate 
precedent.265 Put differently, to state that circuit courts are better able of main­
taining uniformity does not mean district courts are incapable of fulfilling this 
function. Indeed, with limited appeals, considerable discretion, and greater pub­
lic visibility, arguably "district judges have even greater control over the law 
than do their appellate counterparts, yet they often operate free from appellate 
oversight and public scrutiny."266 Despite workload and other hindrances, dis­
trict courts exercise their decision-making power competently and are reversed 
less than half as frequently as circuit courts.267 
To the extent necessary, district courts also can adopt characteristics to 
enhance the quality of binding precedent. If busy trial schedules are hindering 
full consideration of an issue, trial judges can choose to issue opinions in non­
precedential form. 268 By limiting the number of legal issues a judge can con­
sider, stare decisis may actually allow district judges to put more time into the 
legal issues decided, perhaps increasing the quality of the decisions. Moreover, 
district courts can decide issues collegially, whether through multi-judge 
262 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006) (Administrative Procedures Act); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006) 
(review of Social Security Act decisions). 

263 Districts recognize this by exempting such proceedings from the scope of discovery 

requirements and timing requirements. E.g., D.D.C. LocAL R. 16.3(b); E.D. M1cH. LocAL R. 

16.l(e)(2); S.&E.D.N.Y. LocAL R. 16.1. 

264 They may lack these four characteristics, but they also share many characteristics with 
appellate courts. For example, judges on both courts have law clerks to aid them in research­
ing legal issues and drafting opinions. 
265 It does, however, mean that questions of state law are subject to further review by supe­
rior courts, which the Supreme Court held in Regina College. See Salve Regina Coll. v. 
Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991). 
266 Levin, supra note 3, at 977. 

267 U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 28-29 (1994). 

268 Circuit courts do this routinely, and such opinions are viewed as junk law produced by 

an overworked judiciary. Penelope Pether, Constitutional Solipsism: Toward a Thick Doc­
trine of Article III Duty; Or Why The Federal Circuits' Nonprecedential Status Rules Are 
(Profoundly) Unconstitutional, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 955, 961-62 (2009). This 
position is not without controversy. Scholars have argued that certain litigation groups­
including minorities, convicted defendants, prisoners, aliens, and pro se plaintiffs-are more 
likely to have their cases decided via an unpublished opinion. See Penelope Pether, Sorcer­
ers, Not Apprentices: How Judicial Clerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 
ARiz. ST. L.J. 1, 20 (2007); Stephen L. Wasby, Unpublished Court ofAppeals Decisions: A 
Hard Look at the Process, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 67, 76 (2004). Those concerned with 
the treatment of litigants would argue that binding the entire circuit through every opinion is 
needed to ensure that the deciding panel carefully weighs what it says, which is what every 
litigant, represented or not, wealthy or not, expects from the court. 
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panels,269 en bane proceedings, or by circulating the opinion to the bench for 
input.210 
Another challenge that could be lodged against the law of the district is 
that it will stifle experimentation, and thereby impair appellate court decision 
making. Just as the Supreme Court benefits from having a split of authority 
among circuit courts, the circuit court benefits from the different arguments 
made and sources of authority relied upon by different judges, and can observe 
the practicalities of different approaches. 
Even assuming this argument could be a valid reason for rejecting stare 
decisis,271 it fails in practice. District court stare decisis would limit the number 
of different rationales to the number of districts instead of the number of dis­
trict judges. For issues of national scope, there would remain nearly a hundred 
different districts to pull law from (to say nothing of state courts). Even if 
limited to those districts within a circuit, each circuit (with the exception of the 
D.C. Circuit) has multiple districts to consider. For issues of state law, although 
the number of districts likely to deal with an issue shrinks to those districts 
within the state at issue, the possibility of conflict still remains. Many states 
have more than one federal district, and in those that do not, lower state courts 
are free to provide a different perspective from their federal counterparts. Thus, 
the sheer number of districts provides plenty of laboratories for new legal 
ideas.272 And, to ride the laboratory analogy a bit further, committing a district 
to one legal rule has the added benefit of allowing repetition of the legal experi­
ment on new facts.273 Circuit splits may aid the Supreme Court, but this does 
not require intra-circuit splits as well.274 
Nor is the idea of district courts developing and applying broad law an 
unprecedented concept. Indeed, in other contexts district judges are vested with 
enormous power to impose their legal decisions on others. For example, a sin­
gle district judge can strike down a federal statute, reverse an agency regulation 
of nationwide impact, or impose injunctive relief on a national entity (say, a 
269 However, having three district judges consider an issue has not been considered suffi­
cient for stare decisis treatment in the past. See, e.g., Farley v. Farley, 481F.2d1009 (3d Cir. 
1973). 
270 United States ex rel. Smith v. Warden of Philadelphia Cnty. Prison, 87 F. Supp. 339, 346 
(E.D. Pa. 1949) (Bard, J., concurring) (explaining that he asked the other judges to join him 
in hearing a difficult case). 

271 Cf. James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made In America: U.S. Legal Methods and 

the Rule ofLaw, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 517, 550 (2006) (discussing the argument for allowing 

circuit diversity to function as a laboratory, and noting "they should have asked the labora­

tory subjects how they felt!"). 

272 Id. (noting that one of the arguments against a national court resolving circuit splits was 
that '"many circuit courts act as 'laboratories' of new or refined legal principles"'). 
213 Id. 
274 U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 27 (1994) ("We have 
found, however, that debate among the courts of appeals sufficiently illuminates the ques­
tions that come before us for review. The value of additional intra-circuit debate seems to us 
far outweighed by the benefits that flow to litigants and the public from the resolution of 
legal questions."). 
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large employer, or the federal govemment).275 True, some acts remain subject 
to appeal, but the safety valve of an appeal is equally available to challenge 
erroneous district court precedent. 
Moreover, another example of district courts' broad authority is their abil­
ity to certify a class action and potentially bind millions of individuals.276 Once 
a class action judgment is entered and any appeals exhausted, class members 
have no opportunity to revisit the judge's rulings, even if they lacked actual 
notice of the case.277 Although this is a broader rule with harsher consequences 
than stare decisis, and therefore has greater procedural safeguards, 278 it does 
undercut any argument that district courts are unqualified to bind more than a 
few parties through application of horizontal stare decisis.279 
D. District Courts as Appellate Courts 
There is a cost to binding a district court to the decision of the first district 
court judge to enter a published opinion on a matter. The fact that courts are 
currently unwilling to accept this cost shows the courts' lack of confidence in 
their own decisions. It is not surprising that others-both other courts and non­
judicial actors-share this view.280 
A similar phenomenon is seen in the circuit court's practices. When a 
circuit court announces a rule via unpublished opinion, and therefore does not 
bind itself, that opinion is given much less weight by other courts.281 For exam­
ple, its status as nonbinding precedent is reflected in the general rule that 
unpublished circuit decisions do not clearly establish law to overcome qualified 
275 See, e.g., Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1986) (discussing injunction against 
Department of Labor that affected rights of non-parties); Diller & Morawetz, supra note 
172, at 824 n.88. 
276 In re Diet Drugs, 282 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing class action of 6 million 
members). 
277 Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 874 (1984); Reppert v. Mar­
vin Lumber & Cedar Co., Inc., 359 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 2004). 
278 For example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 includes provisions designed to maximize notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. In contrast, district court stare decisis would not provide notice in 
the same way as class actions, although individuals who may be bound by the decision do 
have the opportunity to be heard through the intervention mechanism. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
24. 

279 See Barrett, supra note 57, at 1036-40 (comparing stare decisis with claim preclusion, 

including under class action and "virtual representation" theories). 

280 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) ("The doctrine of stare decisis is essential 

to the respect accorded to the judgments of the Court ...."). It is also possible that binding 

stare decisis will lead to better district court decisions, at least when published. The idea is 

that courts will more carefully reason a decision if they know they will be stuck with it 

indefinitely. I am skeptical of this rationale, but it has been advanced with considerable vigor 

in the debate over whether to allow circuit courts to remove some of their decisions from 

stare decisis altogether. Nash & Pardo, supra note 33, at 1751 ("It stands to reason that a 

court that knows that its opinions will bind itself, and possibly bind lower courts, will con­

sider more carefully its reasoning before issuing judgments and opinions that announce new 

rules of law"). I predict that any such improvement is minimal, as most federal judges recog­





281 E.g., Epperson v. Entm't Express, Inc., 242 F.3d 100, 106 n.5 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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immunity for public officials.282 Lower courts in the circuit need not follow 
it.283 The issuing court's view of its decision matters a great deal in convincing 
(or requiring) others to go along. 
Currently, district courts are not able to command respect to their pro­
nouncements beyond the immediate parties to a case. This failure is most dra­
matic in those circumstances where district courts function as appellate courts. 
In most circumstances, magistrate judges284 and bankruptcy courts285 see their 
decisions appealed to a district court judge. Yet, unlike the binding nature of 
vertical precedent elsewhere in the federal system, the majority view is that 
bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges are free to disagree with and disregard 
district court precedent.286 The district court's lack of stare decisis is a common 
rationale for this practice.287 This hinders district courts' efforts to effectively 
promote predictability and uniformity throughout a judicial district, including 
its obligation to supervise bankruptcy courts and magistrate judges.288 
282 Hogan v. Carter, 85 F.3d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Since unpublished opinions are 
not even regarded as binding precedent in our circuit, such opinions cannot be considered in 
deciding whether particular conduct violated clearly established law for purposes of adjudg­
ing entitlement to qualified immunity. We could not allow liability to be imposed upon 
public officials based upon unpublished opinions that we ourselves have determined will be 
binding only upon the parties immediately before the court."). 
283 United States v. Simpson, 520 F.3d 531, 534 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008). 

284 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2006 & Supp. III 2009); FED. R. Crv. P. 72. 

285 28 U.S.C.A. § 158 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 112-39). 

286 E.g., In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen 

Register, No. 08-MC-0595, 2008 WL 5255815, *1 n.1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2008) (magistrate 
judge not bound); In re Raphael, 238 B.R. 69, 77 (D. N.J. 1999) (bankruptcy court not 
bound); Bussel, supra note 100, at 1071 (collecting cases from bankruptcy court). The 
minority position is that such courts are bound, e.g., In re Rupp, 415 B.R. 72, 74 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting this is the "substantial minority" position); Health Servs. Credit 
Union v. Shunnarah (In re Shunnarah), 273 B.R. 671, 672 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Paul Steven 
Singerman & Paul A. A vron, Of Precedents and Bankruptcy Court Independence, 22 AM. 
BANKR. INsT. J. 55, 56-57 (2003) (collecting cases from bankruptcy court, which can put 
magistrate and bankruptcy judges in the awkward position of following a district court opin­
ion but being reversed regardless). Cf Brian E. Mattis & B. Taylor Mattis, Erie and Florida 
Law Conflict at the Crossroads: The Constitutional Need for Statewide Stare Decisis, 18 
NovAL. REv. 1333, 1348 (1994) ("The irony of vertical without horizontal stare decisis is 
that a trial court may be reversed for doing the 'right' thing (following another district) or 
affirmed for doing the 'wrong' thing (rejecting precedent from another district)."). With law 
of the district, the arguments for not following the rulings of the court with supervisory 
jurisdiction become much weaker. 
287 Richardson v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co. (In re Lucre, Inc.), 434 B.R. 807, 831-32 n.56 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010); In re Ford, 415 B.R. 51, 60 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2009) ("[J]ust as 
there is no 'law of the district' mandated for district judges to follow, bankruptcy judges are 
likewise not bound by decisions of a single district court judge."). 
288 Seitter v. Guilford Mills, Inc. (Jn re Illig Indus.), No. 01-20189-7, 2004 WL 2044113, at 
*3 n.6 (Bankr. D. Kan. Jun. 8, 2004) (collecting cases); cf Mattis & Mattis, supra note 286, 
at 1348 (noting the "logical relationship that ought to exist between vertical and horizontal 
stare decisis"). It is important not to overstate this point. One can conceive of a regime where 
lower courts do not follow the rulings of higher courts, as is common in civil law countries. 
See generally Caminker, supra note 2. But this is not the approach that the federal system 
(with its common law roots) typically employs, and this is a method that is unfamiliar to 
federal judges and advocates. 
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Similarly, the actions of administrative agencies are routinely reviewed by 
courts.289 In such cases, courts expect agencies to adhere to the law governing 
the circuit with jurisdiction to adjudicate challenges to agency actions.290 
Although there are often difficulties in knowing which circuit will ultimately 
preside over a challenge to administrative action, where there is certainty of 
venue, agency nonacquiesence is viewed as a challenge to the judiciary's 
authority as a final arbiter of law.291 In addition, nonacquiesence under these 
circumstances leads to a waste of time and resources, as any aggrieved party 
will have to go through the steps of challenging the agency in court and, after 
citing binding circuit law, win a more or less automatic reversal.292 
Although agencies must adhere to settled circuit law, they currently need 
not follow district court precedent even for cases challengeable to a particular 
district.293 Why should agencies comply with a rule of law that the issuing 
court itself treats with little weight? If district courts were to follow their own 
opinions more regularly, however, the case for agency intradistrict nonac­
quiesence becomes harder,294 at least when it is clear which court will be 
reviewing agency decisions.295 District courts would be far better equipped to 
fulfill their supervisory function over Article I proceedings if Article I actors 
were compelled to listen to the district court, which would be the case if district 
judges set district law. 
289 There are numerous statutory provisions directing challenges to agency action to the 
circuit court, but in the absence of one of those, district courts hear the remainder of chal­
lenges to reviewable agency action. Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp. 
Research & Special Prag. Admin., 457 F.3d 956, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2006). 
290 See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Federal 
Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989) (noting, but criticizing, judicial disap­
proval of intracircuit nonacquiesence). 
291 Id. at 701-02, 711-13. 
292 Id. at 750 ("Because a litigant will probably prevail simply through the application of 
stare decisis, there will be a strong incentive to seek review, since, in balancing the costs and 
benefits of challenging the agency action, the discount for the risk of not prevailing before 
the court will be very small."). 
293 Wang v. Slattery, 877 F. Supp. 133, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The BIA correctly noted that 
. . . it is not 'bound to follow the published cases of a federal district court in cases arising 
within the same district' ...."). 
294 Estreicher & Revesz, supra note 290, argue that compelling agency interests in national 
uniformity justify intracircuit nonacquiesence. This argument is stronger at the district court 
level, where tlle potential for a hodgepodge of rulings disrupting the national scheme, and 
where rulings are less final than circuit law. One answer for this is that this choice is for 
Congress to make. When Congress has worried about district court review of agency deci­
sion, it has provided for direct circuit review. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, AR'IHUR R. MILLER, 
EDWARD H. COOPER, 16 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED 
MATIERS § 3941 (2d ed.). 
295 With many district courts, the potential number of forums increase dramatically, and 
parties may enjoy greater flexibility choosing where the lawsuit is filed. This will not always 
be the case, however; sometimes the agency will know where a challenge will be brought. 42 
U.S.C. § 405(g) (2006) (providing for judicial review "in the district court of the United 
States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides"). 
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CONCLUSION 
I have argued that district court stare decisis is authorized by law and 
recommended by policy, and the different position of district courts within the 
federal judicial hierarchy does not account for the departure from the stare deci­
sis model of their circuit court cognate. But we are now left with a puzzle. If 
district courts indeed possess the power to either adopt the law of the district or 
require some other level of deference to precedent, and there are good reasons 
to do so, why have so few followed this path? I think the answer is not that 
district courts are choosing not to, but that they have not yet given the matter 
consideration. 
I suspect that at one point a court rejected an argument that another dis­
trict's opinion was binding, stating, "[A] decision of one District Court is not 
binding upon a different District Court."296 This statement was then applied 
descriptively to intra-district precedent, overlooking crucial differences 
between the rationales for deference.297 District courts had no cause to scruti­
nize this statement, and accepted it as a truth. Over time, perhaps, the descrip­
tion of fact became viewed as a mandate. District courts then relied on the non­
binding nature of their own precedent, and did not consider whether, despite 
being non-binding, it was worth any deference.298 This has led to where we are 
today: amidst a multitude of unconsidered and undefined rules. 
Although I have argued for strong stare decisis practice among district 
courts, my argument applies more broadly than the specific proposal advanced. 
I hope that a new conversation is started-in the scholarship, and among the 
courts-about whether district courts should enact some form of stare decisis 
practice, how this practice is decided, and how it is communicated to the pub­
lic. I do not expect courts to march in lockstep, automatically following either 
the specific proposal I have advanced or practices adopted by circuits or other 
districts. Instead, they should undertake the critical analysis and self-assess­
ment to determine how jurisprudence might be promoted through a stare decisis 
practice. Any number of local conditions-for example, the state of practice in 
the district, the relationship among judges, or the size of the court299-might 
counsel for different characteristics, large or small, in stare decisis. But, as I 
296 Grove Press, Inc. v. Blackwell, 308 F. Supp. 361, 374 (E.D. Mich. 1969). 
297 Starbuck v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 556 F.2d 450, 457 n.13 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that 
"[t]he doctrine of stare decisis does not compel one district court judge to follow the deci­
sion of another" but citing authority that "a decision of one district court is not binding upon 
a different district court"); Powell & Concannon, supra note 62, at 360 n.9 ("While there are 
to be found in the reports numerous instances where such divisions or departments have 
rendered conflicting decisions, this has probably been due to a feeling that such divisions or 
departments were in the same situation as coordinate courts, one of which is not bound by 
the decision of another" (citing 21 C.J.S. Courts § 196 (1966))). 
298 First of Am. Bank v. Gaylor (In re Gaylor), 123 B.R. 236, 242 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991) 
(relying on proposition that there is no law of the district to conclude there was no stare 
decisis at all); see also Clower v. Orthalliance, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1335 (N.D. Ga. 
2004). 
299 For example, districts with fewer judges are particularly good candidates for a "law of 
the district" practice. Cf. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 22 (2002) (stating that too many 
judges on one circuit court would "destroy[] [its] ... ability to maintain, through en bane 
rehearings, a predictable law of the circuit"); PosNER, supra note 164, at 99 (stating that a 
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have argued, the law of the district has much to offer, and would be an advanta­
geous choice for many courts. 
Yet even if district courts remain unconvinced by my proposal, I hope that 
they will take the opportunity to consider and articulate publicly what practices 
they will follow. I would suggest that district courts articulate their stare decisis 
practice by proceeding en bane and issuing an opinion detailing the policy.300 
Subsequently, these districts might amend their local rules to lay out procedures 
incidental to the rule, such as details concerning publication and en bane prac­
tices.301 Whatever the substance, and however procedurally implemented, a 
reasoned and communicated practice would be a tremendous improvement for 
both bench and bar from the status quo, where non-public, unsettled, inconsis­
tently applied, and apparently unreasoned rules govern. 
circuit court can most readily control its precedent through en bane when it has fewer than 
nine judges). 
300 See Nat'l Sign & Signal v. Livingston (In re Livingston), 379 B.R. 711, 725 n.16 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007) (suggesting such an order), rev'd on other grounds, 422 B.R. 645 
(W.D. Mich. 2009); see also S. Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370, 1370 n.2 (Fed. 
Cir. 1982) (en bane) ("It is appropriate that the court adopt its substantive law precedents in 
a judicial decision accompanied by a published opinion."). The involvement of multiple 
members of the district's judges avoids the ineffectiveness of a single judge acting alone. See 
supra text accompanying note 111. 
301 See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2006). The adoption of stare decisis through local rule may 
exceed the purpose of local rules. See S. Corp., 690 F.2d at 1370 n.2 ("The Rules of the 
court are designed to provide procedural guidance and would be an inappropriate locale in 
which to repose the jurisprudential bases of the court's future decisions."); See Bradley Scott 
Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated By Rule?, 67 Omo ST. L.J. 645, 671 (2006). 
Perhaps this is why some circuit courts instead rely on "internal operating procedures," an 
apparently distinct creature from local rules. See supra text accompanying footnote 85. But 
see 28 U.S.C. § 207l(f) ("No rule may be prescribed by a district court other than under this 
section."). 
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